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Foreword
This report details the methods developed and applied for
performing common cause analysis at the systems and component level
for large, highly redundant engineered safety systems in nuclear
reactors. More generally, the methodology is also applicable to
many other engineered systems outside of the nuclear area.
Major progress in this project was made in testing and refining
the MOCUS-BACFIRE-II-BETAFACTOR analysis code, called MOBB, which
takes the system fault tree diagram, generates cutsets and then
employs the generic cause method developed by Fussell to identify
common cause candidates. Then, the Beta-Factor method developed
by Fleming is applied at the single component level to quantify
the contribution to total system unavailability of common cause
failures. Finally, an uncertainty analysis is performed to generate
confidence bounds on both the top event and all cutsets employing
both a standard Monte Carlo approach and improved Method-of-Moments
method.
In addition, a second code was developed to apply the analysis
approach of seismic risk analysis using discrete probability distri-
bution (DPD) arithmetic. This code was applied to analyze a
sample problem fault tree to include failures due to seismic events.
This code is available for any follow-up work which should
continue to apply the concept of seismic fragility more generally
to the component (or system) susceptibility to various common cause
events (e.g., corrosion, humidity, temperature , pressure , etc.).
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This project completes the final version of the fault tree common
cause analysis package, MOBB. Examples of application are included.
Special thanks are extended to Dr. Mohammed Modarres, formerly
of SAI and now with the University of Maryland, for his advice,







The quantitative common cause analysis code, MOBB, is
extended to include uncertainties arising from modelling uncertain-
ties and data uncertainties. Two methods, Monte Carlo simulation
and the Method-of-Moments are used to propagate uncertainties through
the analysis. The two different capabilities of the code are then
compared. When component failure rates are assumed lognormallv
distributed, bounded lognormal (Sb) distributions are used to evalu-
ate higher moment terms, as required by the Method-of-Moments, in
order to minimize the effect of the tail of the lognormal. A code
using the discrete probability distribution (DPD) method is developed
for analyzing system unavailability due to common initiating events
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As stated in the proposal, the purpose of this research
project was to further assess and extend the MOCUS-BACFIRE computer
code, first combined by Modarresin 1979(1) to provide the utilities
with an effective and powerful tool for analysis and evaluation of
common cause failures(CCF) in a system represented by its fault
tree diagram.
The project has accomplished the following tasks:
(1) Assessment and comparison of MOCUS-BACFIRE, BACFIRE-II
and COMCAN-II codes;
(2) redefining existing criteria for identifying CCFs and
incorporating them into the selected code;
(3) selection and incorporation of a more sophisticated
common cause quantification method; and
(4) evaluating sample problems chosen by the utility sponsors.
A detailed review of each of the specific contract tasks is presented
in the attached Tables I- V.
The expected benefits of this work to the utilities are to
obtain codes which are:
(1) capable of identifying common cause failures directly
from the fault tree diagram;
(2) inexpensive and easy to operate;
(3) capable of automatically generating common cause candidates
which are significantly contributing to the failure of the
system due to common cause failures;
(4) capable of calculating the top event probability (or
unavailability) by considering both random and common cause
failures;
(5) especially suited for man-machine communication and its
advantages.






REVIEW OF PROJECT TASKS
Assessment of existing qualitative common cause
failure analysis codes that use generic cause






BACFIRE is preferable over the others, and is the







Choose an appropriate quantitative method to quantify
the common cause candidates and evaluate the system
unavailability.
Completed May, 1981
Beta-factor method developed by Karl Fleming at
General Atomic for HTGR-PRA is perferable. This
method was integrated into the modified BACFIRE
packaqe. (It has also been refined and updated).
MOBB code.









Implementation of the qualitative method chosen
to quantify common cause candidates and evaluate
system unavailability.
Completed August, 1981
Sample problems were run using the MOBB code.
These included analyses of the following two
systems:
-Auxiliary feedwater system (AFWS)
-Fire protection system (FPS)
-Cho Mak's SM thesis
-Paper for Portchester PRA meeting
Useful examples to guide utility efforts in
systems analysis.
TABLE IV
Review and further extend the capabilities of the
code to include uncertainty analysis, data collection
and interpretation, redefine parameters and failure
criterion.
Completed.
Additionally, a separate code for uncertainty analysis
using the DPD method of seismic risk analysis
(HADES code). Examples have been run.
Preliminary
Conclusions: -Monte Carlo Method applicable
-Has been incorporated into MOBB.
-Sample problems run.
Further work needed (beyond this project scope);
-More efficient method required to reduce computer time.
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TABLE V
Use of final version of the code for a detailed







End of September, 1982.
Revised code on tape for use in IBM-370 system.
-Project final report




5II. Quantitative Common Cause Failure Analysis
A. Dependent Failure Analysis
Dependent failures are an extremely important aspect of risk
quantification and must be given adequate treatment to avoid gross
underestimation of risk. Risk estimates can be many orders of
magnitude off if the possibilities for dependent failures are
overlooked. An example of how crucial common cause dependencies
can be was the case of the Titanic; it was thought to be "unsinkable"
because it was designed to have so-called "independent" compartments
in the bottom hull of the ship. The Titanic sunk because the depen-
dency between compartments was overlooked by the ship designers.
This is an important lesson to all reliability engineers.
There are two major types of dependencies between events:
1. Actual physical dependencies between systems and/or
events (e.g., seismic event and containment failure
events.) These dependencies are discussed in Section
3.7, "Analysis of Dependent Failures," PRA Procedures
Guide, NRC, 1982, K.N. Fleming, author. (1)
2. "State-of-knowledge" dependencies for nominally
identical components whose failure rates are presumed
identical. This type of data-related dependency is
discussed further in Section 16.5, PLG Handbook,
p. 109 on. (2)
The first kind of dependency is what is most often studied
in common cause analysis. The second kind is somewhat new in
the sense that it has only recently been identified. It is related
to the subjectivist (or Bayesian) theory of probability.
Mathematically, two failure events A and B are said to be
dependent if their frequency, p, satisfies:
q(A and B) = p(A).(BjA) r p(A)-(B) (1)
In other words, the frequency of concurrent failure events
A and B (4(A and B)) cannot be expressed simply as a product of the
unconditional failure event frequencies (A) and p(B). Dependent
failures are defined into different groups as shown in Table VI(1)
with methods which have been used to handle each shown in Table VII.
Analysis of Intercomponent Dependencies
The type of common cause failures that are of most interest
here are those classified as Type 3 in Table VI, or intercomponent
dependencies. Before the quantification of the system unavailability
can be completed, it is necessary to analyze the possibilities for
dependencies among the basic component failures.
TABLE VI
DEPENDENT FAILURE CLASSIFICATIONS (1)
Type 1 Common Cause Initiators (external events) These include external
and internal events that have the potential for initiating a
plant transient and increase the probability of failure in
multiple plant systems. These events usually, but not always,
result ihsevere envirornmental stresses on components and
structures. Examples include fires, floods and earthquakes.
Type 2 Intersystem Dependencies These are events or failure causes that
create interdependencies among the probabilities of failure of
multiple systems. States another way, intersystem dependencies
cause the conditional probability of failure of a given system
along an accident sequence to be dependent on the success or
failure of systems that precede' it in the sequence. There are
several subtypes of interest in risk analysis.
Type 2A Functional Dependencies These are dependencies among systems
that follow from the plant design philosophy, system capabilities
and limitations, and design base. One example is a system that
is not used or needed unless other systems have failed. Another
is a system that is designed to function only in conjunction
with the successful operation of other system.
Type 2B Shared Equipment Dependencies These are dependencies of multiple
systems on the same components, subsystems, or auxiliary
equipment. Example are: 1) a collection of pumps and valves that
provide a coolant injection and a coolant recirculation function
when the functions appear as different events in the event tree,
and 2) components in different systems fed from the same
electrical bus.
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TABLE VI, cont'd (1)
Type 2C Physical Interactions These are fialure mechanisms, similar to
those in common cause initiators, that do not cause an initiating
event but nonetheless increase the probability of multiple system
failures occurring at the same time. Often they are associated
with extremeenvirormental stresses created by the failure of one
or more systems after an initiating event. For example, the
failure of a set of sensors in one system can be caused by the
excessive temperature resulting from the failure of a second system
intended to cool the heat source.
Type 2D Human Interaction Dependencies These are dependcies introduced
by human actions, including errors of omission and commission.
The persons involved can be any~'ne associated with a plant life
cycle activity, including designers, manufacturers, constructors,
inspectors, operators, and maintenance personnel. Such a failure
occurs, for example, when an operator turns off a system after
failing to correctly diagnose the plant condition.
Type 3 Intercomponent Dependencies These are events or failure causes
that result in a dependence among the probabilities of failure
of multiple components or subsystems. The multiple failures of
interest in risk analysis are usually within the same system or
the same minimal cutset that has been identified for a system
or an entire accident sequence. Subtypes 3A, 3B, 3C and 3D are
defined to correspond with subtypes 2A, 2B, 2C and 2D, respectively,
except that the multiple failures occur at the subsystem and
component level instead of at the system level.
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TABLE VII
METHODS FOR MODELLING DEPENDENT FAILURES (1)
Dependent Failure Type
Type 1: Caommon Cause Initiators
Type 2A: Intersystem Functional
Dependencies
Type 2B: Intersystem Shared
Equipment Dependencies
Type 2C: Intersystem Physical
Interactions




Recommended Method of Modelling
1-a Event Specific Models
3-a Qualitative Search Procedures
1-b Event Tree/Boundary Condition
Method
1-b Event Tree/Boundary Condition
Method
1-c Fault Tree Linking Method
1-a'tvent Specific Models
3-a Qualitative Search Procedures
1-b Event Tree/Boundary Condition
Method
1-c Fault Tree Linking Method
1-d Fault Tree Cause Analysis
1-e Human Reliability Model
1-d Fault Tree Cause Analysis
2-a Beta Factor Method
2-b Binomial Failure Rate Model
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Consider a system of three components A, B, and C; let the
reliability block diagram be:
The corresponding system unavailability, Q, is:
Q = P(A and B) + P(C) - P(AnB AC)
= P(A)* P(BIA) [l-P(C AB)] + P(C)
where
P(x) = availability of component x
P(ylz and t) = unavailability of component y given
components Z and t are failed;
P(BIA)>>P(B) in this example.
There are three basic approaches to CCFA:
(1) Develop causes explicitly in fault trees or cause
tables (primarily qualitative approach)
(2) Beta-Factor Method (Parametric)
(3) Binomial Failure Rate Model (Parametric)
Tne greatest limitation of approach (1) is that in an effort to
ensure completeness, an intractable number of dependencies are
identified. Taken separately, these dependencies can often be
discounted on the basis of a perceived low occurrence probability.
Experience shows, however, that as a class they cannot be dismissed.
Thus it is difficult to know which common cause candidates are
important and which are not. Therefore, we must go to quantitative
procedure, as is done in this project, such as the Beta-Factor
method. Before doing this, however, we review some previous work
in this area.
B. Previous Work on Quantification of Common Cause
Unavailability calculations of engineering safety features and
risk assessment studies (3,4) revealed the importance of considering
potential common cause failures in estimating the probability of
failure of redundant systems. It is a well-recognized fact that
reliability predictions of redundant systems are overestimated
when the potential for common cause failures is not properly
accounted for. In fact, the RSS amply demonstrated that CCF may
contribute the most to system unavailability.
The state-of-the-art of CCF analysis up to 1979 has been reviewed
by Rasmussen et al. (5). Hayden (6) separated CCF's into component
and system failures and categorized them in terms of generic
failure mechanisms such as design error, human error and generic
events. Apostolakis (7) used a constant hazard rate for reliability
and redefined the hazard rate by using a point estimate of the
conditional probability that a unit failure is due to a common
cause failure.
Certainly the most thorough CCF analysis was performed as
part of the RSS in each of the following analysis steps:
- Event tree construction
- Fault tree construction
- Fault tree quantification
- Event tree quantification
- Special engineering investigations
Computerized efforts in the qualitative and quantitative procedure
of common cause failures were begun with special emphasis after
the publication of the RSS. Burdick et al,(8) reported on the COMCAN
-II.-1. LI/YEII-U-~-II~ --sli
code. This code is designed to aid in the qualitative determination
of:
(1) single secondary events that could fail an entire minimum
cutset, given all components in the cutset share the same
susceptibility location.
(2) Common links among components such as common circuitry,
common maintenance personnel or common manufacturers
for all components in a cutset.
As a result, COMCAN requires as one of its inputs a set of
minimal cutsets which have been obtained by some other qualitative
analysis code. It is quite apparent that for large fault trees
with a high degree of replication and the possibility of several
common cause failures, the computational efforts involved in the
minimal cutset sorting become tremendous, if not impossible, due
to the large amount of minimal cutsets. Modarres et al. (1) have
developed a computer code package to resolve this difficulty by
coupling the cutset generator code MOCUS (9) and common cause failure
analysis code BACFIRE (10) to obtain the MOCUS-BACFIRE Package.
The BACFIRE Code is a newer and more adequate version of the COMCAN
Code. However, a newly developed version of the COMCAN Code, which
is called COMCAN-II (11), has been recently developed to directly
evaluate common cause failures from the fault tree diagram.
Similarly, BACFIRE was extended to obtain the BACFIRE-II code (12).
Therefore, the codes COMCAN-II, BACFIRE-II and MOCUS-BACFIRE have
relatively similar capabilities. However, they employ different
algorithms to determine CCFs, and the efficiency and limitations of
these codes had not been compared and assessed yet.* The development
of the COMCAN methodology laid the ground for the first time with
basic rules which will be common to all future efforts involving
common cause handling. The most important thing which was realized
during the course of the development of this code is the recognition
of the importance of generic classification. The possible physical
sources for a specific secondary event can develop into an
absolutely endless list. Only a unique generic classification makes
the search for minimal cutset sharing susceptibilities a tractable
task. For this purpose, a preprocessor has been implemented in
COMCAN which needs as input generic categorization of secondary
causes.
A special category has been added which links conditions among
components to locate potential common cause failures of minimal
cutsets. The other three categories considered by COMCAN are:
- Mechanical or Thermal
- Electrical or Radiation
- Chemical or Miscellaneous
Recent studies (13, 14) have shown that the criteria for
identifying a cutset as a common cause candidate in the COMCAN code is
not unique and sufficient for a complete CCF analysis. It is
important, however, to select an adequate set of CCF criteria
in order to obtain a set of adequate common cause candidates.
The review of computerized qualitative common cause failure
analysis suggests the following conclusions. First, the original
COMCAN code approach, which uses the complete minimal cutset
information, has no potential for further development because of
They have been compared in this project.
a prohibitive amount of cutsets that must be input to the code
for a large fault tree. Second, the codes MOCUS-BACFIRE and COMCAN-II
eliminate the necessity to input the cutsets. Therefore, instead
of the cutsets, they require the fault tree to be input. However,
they had not been fully tested and assessed.* A careful revision is
required to establish a set of new criteria for identification of
common cause candidates from the cutsets.
The state-of-the-art in common cause quantification is
largely determined by the work described in WASH-1400 and the new
developments by Vesely (15). Whereas in WASH-1400 common cause
failure probabilities were evaluated using upper and lower proba-
bility bounds, Vesely showed that common cause failure probabilities
can also be evaluated directly by using the multivariate exponential
model developed by Marshal and Olkin (16). For this purpose, Vesely
developed a statistical estimation technique for cases where common
cause failures are repairable. Two special cases were examined,
the constant failure rate case and the binomial failure rate case.
A BWR scram system served as an example. In another paper, Johnson
and Vesely (17) applied the same technique to the common cause
analysis of valve leakages. In both papers, actual data were used
from EPRI records and Licensee Event Reports (LER), respectively.
It should be noticed that the quantification model used is dependent
upon the data population and presupposes that the components from
a given defined population are subject to similar failure causes.
Fleming and Raabe (18) compared GA's approach (known as s-method)
to both aforementioned methods (i.e., RSS and Vesely's methods).
They have been so compared and assessed in this project,
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The objective of their paper was to show the validity of the common
cause coupling B-method as compared to the bounding technique
of the RSS and the multivariate exponential distribution of Vesely.
Modarres etal. (1)have recently studied a method to quantify
CCF affect by using a Markovian approach. They used exponential
distributions to model and evaluate the failure probability of
cutsets due to both random cause and common cause failures. A
simplified aux-feed system served as an example, and failure
probabilities were close to that predicted by the RSS bounding
method.
C. The Beta-Factor Method (18)
Definition of the Beta Factor
The Beta-Factor of a component event is defined as the fraction
of all common cause failures to the total number of failures, which
include both independent and common cause failures. Since most
components are susceptible to more than one common cause, the level
of susceptibility is used to specify the relative occurrences of a
secondary failure of a component.
The common cause candidates identified can be considered as
a subsystem. To quantify the common cause candidates, Markov
models are applied to these subsystems. The failure and repair
rates are assumed to be exponentially distributed. A non-identical
repairable two-component system with common cause failure is used
as an example. The Markov state transition diagram is shown in
Figure 1. The following assumptions are made to develop the model:
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Figure 1
State Transition Diagram for Repairable 2-Component System
P0 (t) = probability at time t,
both units are
operational
Pl(t) = probability at time t,
only unit i has failed,
- for i = 1,2
f P3 (t) = probability at time t,
both units have failed
/ 1= independent failure rate of/ unit i, for i = 1,2
) A c= common cause failure rate
A= repair rate of unit i, for
/J i = 1,2
3 3= repair rate of both units,
1 and 2
Figure 2
State Transition Diagram for Non-Repairable 2-Component System
PA
(1) Common cause and independent failures are statistically
independent,
(2) common cause failures can only occur with more than one
unit, and they fail simultaneously.
The system of first order differential equations can be
written for the model as:
2 3
P'(t) =-(i=lXi ( t ) +X c ( t ) ) P O ( t ) + i =  P i ( t )  i ( t )  (1)
p'(t) =-(A 2 (t)+ l 3(t) )P (t)+P (t)1 2 (t)+P1(t (t) (2)
P'(t) =-(Al (t)+ 2(t))P2 (t)+P(t)A t)+P (t) 2 (t) (3)
2 2
P'(t) =-(Pi=li (t)+ 3 (t))P (t)+ Pi(t(t)+P (t) (t) (4)
3
i=Pi(t) = 1 (5)
If all the failure and repair rates are time independent and
a set of appropriate boundary conditions are given, equations (1)
to (5) are then a set of linear differential equations which can
be solved by using Laplace transform techniques. The system unavail-
ability at time t is P3 (t) for a 2-component system in parallel.*
Beta-Factor Method
The total failure rate for each unit,A, is assumed constant
with time and can be expanded for its independent and common
cause components:
A = A. + c (6)1 c
where A. is the unit failure rate for independent causes, and
A is the unit failure rate for common cause.
c
Unavailability expressions including test and repair have recently
been developed by lHeising and Fleming in a paper soon to be published.
The component parameter Beta is defined as the fraction of the total
failure rate attributable to common cause failures:
1 = Ac/A (7)
For the same Markov model presented in the previous section,
if the following assumptions are made, then the system model can be
simplified as shown in Figure 2:
(1) constant failure rates with time t,
(2) consider non-repairable components only, and
(3) at time t=0, both units are operable,
i.e. P (t=O)=l and Pi(t=0)=0, for i=1,2,3.
The system of differential equations for the model is:
PO(t) = -(A(+t2 + c ) P O ) (8)
Pl(t) = -(A2+ 22 )P (t)+ L P O t) (9)
P'(t) = -(A 1+ 1 1 )P 2 (t)+ 2P (t) (10)
P (t) = AcPo(t)+(A 2 + X2A)Pl(t)+(Al +13 )P 2 (t) (11)
The system unavailability at time to the second order is:
2 2"
F(t) = P 3 (t)=Act + A1 AA 1A( 1 + )t- ... (12)
= Pr(common cause failure) and Pr(random failures) +
Pr(partial common cause failures) + truncation errors
Generalized to a non-identical and non-repairable n-component
system:
F(t) = At + tn g t j1l i t (n-l)
c i=l i j=l j = i + (13)
i/j
Data Parameters for Beta-Factor Method
The major advantage of using the Beta-Factor method to quantify
common cause candidates is that the model parameters are readily
available from existing data bases. Consider an operating time
period, T, during which data have been collected from each of the
N systems where each system consists of two components of the same
type:
N
S 1 .(n +n +2n. ) (14)
2NT (nil +ni2 ic
N
1 = T 2n. (15)2NT i= ic
= 2 n. ic/i=l(n il+ni2+2nic) (16)
where ni = number of random failure of component 1 ilin system i,
where ni2 = number of random failure of component 1 in system i,
n i2= number of random failure of component 2 in system i, and
n. = number of common cause failure.
Estimations of the Beta Factor for different component types obtained
from reliability experience data are found to have values very closely
clustered in the range from 0.1 to 0.2 [11,12]. Therefore, component
types with unknown Betas can be easily approximated. For minimal
cutsets with more than two units, the Beta Factor model assumes
that all units fail if a common cause failure occurs. The method
is most useful for analyzing common cause failures in systems with
limited redundancy, two or three units. The value) for a minimal
cutset with different components cannot be estimated from data
directly due to the large number of different combinations of
component types. However, cross-component dependencies can generally
be neglected.
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When individual failure probabilities of each cutset are
calculated, the system failure probability (unavailability) can
be calculated as a function of the failure probabilities of
different cutsets, C.:
1
F(S) = iPr(C) - Pr(C C )+ +( m- (17)irj( ij)+..+(-l) Pr(CIQC2 . C) ( )
III. The MOBB Code
A. Code Description
The MOBB code consists of the package MOCUS, BACFIRE-II and
a project coded Beta-Factor method for quantifying both cutset and
top event unavailabilities and uncertainty about the point values
calculated. This code is described in detail in the MOBB code User's
Manual (10). The basic flow diagram of the MOBB code is shown in
Figure 3. The input to the code consists of the system logic model
(fault tree), common cause types and physical domains, specification
of individual component mean-value failure rates (either on demand
or per hour), Beta-Factors, component susceptibilities and rankings
as supplied by the manufacturer or as determined through direct
user experience. The output is a listing of the common cause
candidates, both for relative unavailability and as a function of
the specific generic cause (see Table VIII). The total system
unavailability is also calculated. The uncertainty bounds are
also provided, in that mean and median values are printed out, as
well as with error factors so that 5% and 95% confidence bounds can
be determined, both at the top event and individual cutset level.
(The uncertainty analysis capability of MOBB is discussed further
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Two problems are performed below demonstrating the use of
the MOBB code. The first demonstrates the ability of MOBB to
evaluate and quantify individual system cutsets, while the second
demonstrates that not all problems will require the full application
of code capabilities (i.e.: in the second problem, one common
cause type dominates--human error). These examples demonstrate
that utility system common cause analysis must still depend largely
on the analyst's interpretation and understanding of the problem--
no code can substitute for this basic requirement.
B.1. Warehouse Fire Protection System (FPS)
To demonstrate the use of the MOBB code, a sample problem has
been devised based on a system for fire protection installed at
a fictitious warehouse. (A similar system is used as an example
in Part IV.C of this report, the difference being that on- and off-site
electric power is included in that example.) The schematic flow
diagram for the fire protection system (FPS) is shown in Figure 4.
In Figure 5, the system fault tree is drawn.
In Figure 6, a sample floor map and suceptibility map is shown,
whereby the code user must specify the relative location of the
components in his system and their geometrical susceptibility
(i.e., across all compartments, only a few, or only one).
Then, the user must identify the particular failure mode of
each component; in this case four modes are identified, as shown
in Table IX. The susceptibility type must be specified for each
domain, as shown in Table X, where "P" stands for generic cause or
Warehouse


















Figure 5 ( continued): System Fault Tree











A Fail to start
Fail to function
Table X : Susceptibi~ty Domain
Susceptibilitv Domain Physi ca! Location
P IMPA Al, A2, A3
1, V, T 1MPB Al
2 LPB A.2, A3




susceptibility to pressure, "T" for temperature, "V" for vibration,
etc. Then,each component in the system must be labelled for
input into the code by type, number, and failure mode (Table XI).
Finally, the common cause failure data and total component failure
rates, either input on a per hour or per demand basis, must be
defined, as shown in Table XII.
Results of running the MOBB code for this sample problem revealed
thirty-four common cause candidates (See Tables XIII - XV; sample
computer output) which include two cutsets with only one component.
Strictly speaking, they cannot be defined as common cause candidates,
but are included because they are significant contributors to
the total system failure. The system failure probability due to
independent failure is estimated at 1.21E-4 and the failure proba-
bility due to common cause failure is 4.12E-4 (i.e. system failure
due to common cause is three times as high as failure due to random
failures). The total system failure probability is 5.33E-4 compared
to the original single pumping train system which has a failure
probability of 3.4E-3. There is almost an order of magnitude
improvement in decreasing system unavailability.
If the assumption of total statistical independence of components
is valid, the system unavailability can be as low as 1.OE-5 (the
single component cutsets are dominant contributors). On the other
hand, if the failure is totally dependent, there will be no improvement
by adding an additional train to the FPS. In practice, the result
often attains some value between these two extremes.
~-_lliiLI-~--
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Table XII: Co~mon Cause Failure Data
Basic Failure Beta Generic Cause .Special
Event Rate Factor Susceptibility Condition
FXVOO1AC 1.0E-5/h .23 V, O MI, T, Il
FXV001BC 1.OE-5/h .23 V, 0 MI, Ti, Ii
FXV003AC 1.OE-5/h .23 V, 0 MI, TI, Ii
FXV003BC 1.0E-5/h .23 V, O Ml, TI, Ii
FXV004AO 1.OE-5/h .23 V, 0 MI, TI, Ii
FXV004BO 1.OE-5/h .23 V, 0 Ml, TI, II
FCV002AC 1.OE-5/h .23 V, P, 0 MI, TI, II
FCV002BC 1.0E-5/h .23 V, P, O MI, TI, Il
FPMOO1AA 1.0E-3/D .14 P, 0 El, M2, TI, Ii
FPM001AF 2.0E-4/h .06 P, V, G, 0 El, M2, TI, Il
FPM002BA 1.0E-3/D .14 P, 0 El, M2, T1,. I1
FPM002BF 2.OE-4/h .06 P, V, G, 6 El, M2, TI, Il
FNZ0001F 1.7E-6/h .10 I, V, P, O MI, Tl, Il
FSD0001F 2.8E-4/D .20 T, C, M, 0 E2, M3, T2, Cl
FSD0002F 2.8E-4/D 120 T, C, M, O E2, M3, T2, Cl
FCL0001 .0E-5/D 20 T, C, M, 0 E2, M3, T2, CI
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MINIMAL CUT SET WITIH ONE BASIC EVENT FAILURE PROBABILITY
0. 1700E-06
BASIC EVENI : FCLOOOIF
MINIMAL CUT SET WITH ONE BASIC EVENT FAILURE PROBABILITY
0. IO00E -04
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B.2 Millstone-I Automatic Pressure Relief (APR) System
A sample problem was analyzed for dominant common cause con-
tributors. The system analyzed was the Millstone-I APR (automatic
pressure relief system). A description of the system and the fault
tree for that system are given-in Appendices C and D. It was
found that human error dominates, so that the MOBB code was not
fully applied to run this problem. Results are shown in Figures 7 and 8.
C. Propagation of Uncertainty in MOBB
The MOBB code (20) was modified (as shown in Tables XVI-XVII)
to compare the Monte Carlo simulation method for propagating component
failure rate uncertainties through the fault tree as compared to
the more analytic Method-of-Moments. This was done to establish
a distribution on cutset availability rather than printing only
a single point-value.
It was found that the Method-of-Moments was by far the more
efficient of the two approaches. Improvements on the Method-of
Moments were made by using modified lognormal distributions to
model component failure rates. These are termed, "S", for the
standard lognormal, "SB" for the bounded lognormal, and "St" for the
truncated lognormal. The mathematical formulae for each is given
in Table XVIII,with behavior of the functions shown in Figure 9.
The bounded lognormal, S B was found to render the best results
on a sample problem taken from a recent reference,* where results
agreed well with a Monte Carlo simulation of 3,000 trials (Table X1X).
The Method-of-Moments was therefcre implemented with the S b approximation.
Work done at Westinghouse.
~I(-~^ XIIY"LYI--rr.X~- _^_CrUI~IIIWIUIIYP~--LI
Figure 7
Fault Tree for APR System for Human Error
APR Auto-Remote Actuation








A B A B A B
A: not restored to service after test or maintenance
B: switch or sensor miscalibrated
Fault Tree for Human Error
Figure 8
APR System Analysis
1) Blowdown for LPCI systems
Scenario: small LOCA





APR-3A APR-3D APR-3C APR-3F
2) Relief/Safety Valves Actuation
Function:to relieve high vessel pressure
Full Power Pressure: 1,000 psig
Design Limit Pressure: 1,375 psig
Success Criteria: Any 4 out of the 6 APR or R/S Valves
Scenario: -Turbine Trip from Full Power
-Failure of the Turbine Bypass System
-Failure of the Direct Reactor Scram





APR 3A APR-3D APR-3C APR-3F S/R-3B S/R-3E
3) Manual Actuation Mode
All six valves can be remotely opened from the control room
Success criteria: -Relief Pressure 4/6
-Blowdown (auto/remote) 2/4
-Blowdown (manual) 2/6
----~-~11" 1 ^1*gl(L1-r~~ly~i r .~.
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TABLE XVI
MOBB WITH MONTE CARLO
START
Determine Minimal Cutsets
for the TOP event and the
Dummy events.
Expand the minimal cutset
to basic events and
determine common cause




Use Monte Carlo simulation
method to find the cutset
and system unavailabilities





MOBB WITH METHOD OF MOMENTS
START
Determine Minimal Cutsets
for the TOP event and the
dumny events.
Expand minimal cutset to






Yes N xt Cutset?
No
Calculate system unavail-
ability from the means &





MATHEMATICAL FORMULAE FOR VARIOUS LOGNORMAL FUNCTIONS
EMPLOYED IN METHOD OF MOMENTS






mth Moment = exp[mp + m2a 2/2 ]
Bounded Log-normal Probability Distribution Sb(xip ,o)




mth Moment = 10 x Sb(xlp,a) dx
otherwise
Truncated Log-normal Probability Distribution S (xh i,o)




where C is the normalization factor
C = f0 Sl(xjp,o) dx












f0 x Sb(xlj,oa)dx- fo xm S1(xl,,o)dxl
) xm Sb(xlo,)dxl
Im0 x S (xp,)dx -S(0 xI S(xp,),o)ddxx
x 10 x MS (xx , 1)dxl
Log (m)*





SAMPLE UNAVAILABILITY EXPRESSION: RESULTS OF COMPARISON
Boolean Expression for system unavailability:
S = X, + X2X3 + X4X5 + X6
Basic Events Median of failure probabilities
X1 1x10-3
X2  3x10-2
X3  1x10 -2
-2X4  3x10 -2
X5  1x10-2
X6  3x10 -3
RF=3 RF=10
Method Mean Variance Mean Variance
Discrete 5.936x10 - 3  7.2x10 - 6  1.49x10 -2  2.14x10 -4
Method of
Moments: S1  5.936x10-3  9.4x10 - 6  1.491x0-2 8.76x10 - 4
Sb 5.933x10-3  9.4x10 -6  1.410x10-2  3.97x10-4
St 5.938x10-3  9.4x10 -6  1.424x10-2  4.80x10-4
Monte Carlo
Sample (3000) 5.955x10-3  8.6x10-6  1.426x10 -2  3.97x10
Sample (1200) 5.996x10-3  9.3x10-6  1.477x10 -2  4.73x10-4
Discrete -3  -6  1.402x10-2  1.89x10-4(1200) 5.788x10 6.3x10 1.402x10 1.89x10
Even so, the differences seem relatively minor when plotted
(Figure 10); yet the Sb approximation appears easier to implement
for numerical calculation reasons, and is most accurate. Nevertheless,
any choice involving the use of the Method-of-Moments is more
efficient than Monte Carlo simulation; a factor of at least
10 in savings in computation time can be expected based on this
project's experience in running the code.* Supporting material
is provided in Appendices A-B of this report.
IV. Cutset Susceptibility Concept for Common Cause Analysis
A separate analysis technique for analyzing common cause
failures was applied in this project, with results compared to
that of MOBB for treating cutset uncertainty. A simple code for
performing discrete probability distribution (DPD) arithmetic was
developed and applied to a sample problem, that of the warehouse
fire protection system (FPS) analyzed earlier (see section
B.1), but this time, for seismic contribution to total system un-
availability. Finally, a comparison of uncertainty treatment is
made with that of the MOBB code.**
A. Method Description
As described in section II.A: "Dependent Failure Analysis",
so-called "external" events, such as earthquakes, floods, and
fires, are a type of dependent failure or common cause failure
mechanism. The method which has been developed to deal with seismic
*This result supports the finding of Jackson and Lee, et. al. r21)
and Bier 22).
**This work would be more fully developed in the follow-up proposal
for next year (see Appendix F.4 for proposal description.
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Figure 13
Plot of Resulting Curves of Top Event Unavai--abiity
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risk quantification in nuclear plant risk assessments can, in fact,
be applied to quantify other dependent failure mechanisms of the
"internal" type (i.e., humidity, pressure, temperature, vibration,
human error, etc.). The only constraint in the application is that
due to data collection, yet the seismic risk methodology allows
for a clear presentation of the data uncertainty that perhaps makes
it a more preferable approach to other methods.
The basic idea would be to identify all system cutsets that
are common cause candidates, thus first employing the MOCUS-BACFIRE II
packagp, and then substitute for the Beta-Factor CCF quantification
package with the separate code developed here employing the seismic
risk method approach. The mathematical details of the approach
are now described.
A.l. Treatment of Uncertainty Using DPD Arithmetic (from
PLG Handbook, ref. (2))
In calculations of real world phenomena, there is almost invari-
ably significant uncertainty in the numerical values of parameters.
In these calculations, numerical quantities can be replaced by
probability distributions and mathematical operations between
these quantities should be replaced by analogous operations between
probability distributions.
in risk and reliability calculations, it is often necessary
to perform various operations between probability or frequency
distributions. Take the example of a simple series system of
two components with failure rates X1 and X2. Then the system
failure rate, X, can be defined as:
If we express our state-of-knowledge about the component failure
rates with probability density functions, Pi(Ai), then the
probability distribution for A is the sum:
S
Ps( s) = P 1 (X1 ) + P 2 (X 2 ) (19)
where the symbol "+" between two distributions is understood to
stand for the convolution operation:
Ps(As) = P 1 ( 1 )P 2 (As-Ai)dA1  (20)
0
assuming states-of-information P 1 and P 2 are independent.
For a parallel system:
A =1 x 2 (21)
Ps(As) =P 1(A 1 ) x P 2 ( 2) (22)
where "x" corresponds to the multiplicative convolution operation:
P ( P (A)P X ) dX 1 (23)
s s 1 1 2 A11 10
Combinations far more complicated than this occur routinely in risk
and reliability work. Usually, Monte Carlo can be used to compute
these combinations. An alternate approach is the method of discrete
probability distributions (DPDs).
Rules of DPD Arithmetic
Let X be an ordinary scalar variable, and let X1, X2 ... Xn
denote particular discrete values of x.




Then the set of doublets
<Pi X>' <P2' X2> .."'. <P, Xn > = <Pi ' X.>
is the DPD and is an approximation to a continuous pdf.
'--. .j1
a I I a. I
I I a-) k -1,
Probabilistic Addition
Suppose Z = X + y, x = <Pi' X (26)I Y = <qi' Yi >
Suppose X and y are independent (they are based on independent
states of information:
Then
Z = <P., X.>1 1 + <qj, yi> (27)j 1
= <Pi.qj X + Yi> (28)
this DPD represents
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where raj = Pq, Z.. = X. + y j  (30)
Example:
X =<.1,-1> <.5,1> <.4, 2> (31)
y = <.2,5> <.8,10> (32)
Z = i<.0 2 , 4  <.1,6> <.08,7> <.08,9> <.4,11> <.32,12>3 (33)
S<Piq j , X. + yj>
Multiplication
i ,X >* b c, y >3  = <Pjqj X y >3  (34)
Functional Definitions
Consider Z = f(X), X = <Pi, X.i (35)
so Z = <Pi,f(X i)> (36)
We enter the curvet f(X) with a probability
distribution for X and
emerge with a distribution
for Z.
Suppose now that f itself is also probabilistic (there is
uncertainty on f). We can express quantitatively this uncertainty
by setting out a series of different functional forms f. and
I
assigning probabilities to each:
f = <qj,f> 3 ; C qj = i.j (37)
Graphically:
We enter a probabilistic
function with a probabilistic
argument and emerge with a
probabilistic output. If both
X and f are probabilistic, then
Z is:
49
z j, ] i
f is plotted as a
"band"--a family
of curves with P as
a parameter.
Pitfalls
1. Nondistributivity of Probabilistic Operations
In ordinary arithmetic, if
Q = X[y+Z] then
Q = Xy + XZ distributivity
This does not hold for DPDs--pay careful attention to the
sequencing of operations.
2. Independence and Dependence
Suppose Z = 2X: X = <.2,1><.6,2><.2,3>i
Then Z = <.2,2><.6,4>,<.2,6>
Suppose Z = X + X
Then Z = .04,27><.24,3><.44,4><.24,5><.04,61>
Thus Z = 2X / Z = X + X. The difference is that when we did
the operation X + X, we treated the two distributions as if they
were independent. THEY ARE NOT. Thus, we obtained compensating
uncertainties and a more narrow distribution than we should have.
This situation arises particularly in risk calculations between
similar components.
Thus, use As = 2X1 for series system when components are
identical
(not As = 1 +X 1)2
and s = 1 for parallel system
(not =A x 1 )s 1 1
)~ ._ LI~11
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A.2 Application of Method to Seismic Risk Calculations (2)
Suppose we have a specific structure, S, at a specific location,
L, and wish to know the risk of collapse of this structure due to
earthquake.
What we use is a "seismicity" curve and a "fragility" curve,
as follows:
Seismicity Curve Fragility Curve
I.0
-a) F
&El k-e er 4"j' ,)C PeA AcCeierat o X&
Assume that we run the experiment and knew the curve F(a) exactly.
Suppose also that we had monitored the site L for millions of years
and knew the curve 0(a) exactly.
The frequency of structural failure due to earthquake would be
given by:
( = - d f(a)da (39)
0
Probabilistic Calculation
We really do not know the seismicity curve 4(a) exactly.
Therefore, using the DPD idea, let us express our uncertainty in
4(a) by putting forth a finite family of curves, Di(a), and
assigning to each a probability Pi:
51
Thus:
S E <P i,(a)> (40)
or graphically:
0-
We also do not know the fragility curve exactly, so we express
our state-of-knowledge about the fragility by writing a DPD:
F <qj, Fj(a)> (41)
1.01(
0-
Now, we perform the operation
f = - - F(a)da (42)
0
using DPD arithmetic:
f = I<PijP. ij,> (43)
where
Pij = Piq. (44)
and
= (d i ) F.(a)da (45)ij da 
Il~~__^jllL_^ l  _I I~*____^_~~__ _~__YCIX
This is the "Probability of Failure Frequency" idea.
B. Code Description
The method described in section (A) has been extended as
follows to analyze "internal" common cause events. For each
location in the plant, an "environmental stress" curve analagous
to the seismicity curve in seismic risk analysis is defined by
the user (see Figure 11). A family of such curves can be specified
for the 95%, 50% and 5% confidence levels reflecting the analyst's
uncertainty about the function 4(X).
Next, the susceptibility of the cutset must be specified,
again as a family of curves. This curve can be synthesized from
knowledge concerning the individual component susceptibilities to
each stress type, or on a multi-component, or cutset, level depen-
ding on the analyst's choice (see Figure 12). This curve must be
defined as a function of whether one considers the system to be
operating under normal or accident conditions, where "A" refers to
the conditions considered (A1 for "normal"; A2 for "accident") and
to the state-of-knowledge of the analyst who is specifying this curve.
The result of the analysis are probability density functions,
or PDFs, about the frequency of failure (or unavailability) for
each cutset as a function of the particular environmental stress








Analogous to seismicity curve.
Figure 12











Analogous to seismic fragility curves.
Figure 13
Result of Environmental Stress Analysis on System Cutsets
Probability
Density
I (j4,i;JZ 13-4 t4 332
Failure Frequency
(-A 10
Tlis method then produces a probability distLibutionl on each
cutset's unavailability, indicating uncertainties. The Boolean
expression for the top event is then used,which will generally
be just the sum of all the cutsets, so that the total system unavail-
ability may also be expressed as a "probability of frequency"
distribution.
Implementation of the actual calculational procedure employed
in this approach is shown in Table XX.
C. Sample Problem: Warehouse FPS
The warehouse FPS of section III.B.1 was analyzed here for failure
susceptibility to seismic events using the DPD code written in this
project. The FPS was analyzed for three cases (see Figure 14):
Sl -- one pump train only (PTB) and no diesel generator
S2 -- one pump train with both diesel generator and off-site
power
S3 -- both pump trains with both diesel generator and off-site
power
The fault tree for each of the three system definitions was drawn
(Figure 15) and the Boolean expression found for the top event
(see Table XXIfor System S3). Assumptions were made on the relative
fragility of each cutset to seismic events (see Figures 16-22). The
seismicity of the site was taken to be that of the Zion nuclear plant
side in Chicago for representative purposes only (Figure 23).
Final results of the example calculations are shown in Fiqure
24 indicating the uncertainty of each cutset unavailability due to
seismic events. Note that Sl has a median failure probability
TABLE XX
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System Fault Tree (Sheet 1 of 3)
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TABLE XXI
CUTSET DEFINITION FOR FPS WITH
TOP EVENT BOOLEAN EXPRESSION (SYSTEM S3)
B.QQLEAN EXPRESSION
F = ST + SP + TA + TB
WHERE TA = PTA + TK + ( EC + OP * DG )
TB = PTB + ( EC + OP * DG )
F = ST + SP + PTA * PTB + EC + OP * DG + TK.* PTB
F : SYSTEM FAILURE DUE TO SEISMIC EVENTS
THE FOLLOWING EVENTS ARE CONDITIONAL TO THE SEISMIC EVENTS:
ST : STRUCTURE ( BUILDING AND SUPPORTING STRUCTURE FOR
COMPONENTS TO ATTACH ON )
SP : SPRINKLING SYSTEM
TA : PUMP TRAIN A
TB : PUMP TRAIN B
PTA: PUMP A AND ASSOCIATED VALVES AND PIPING
PTB: PUMP B AND ASSOCIATED VALVES AND PIPING
TK : WATER STORAGE TANK
OP : OFF-SITE POWER SUPPLIES
DG : DIESEL GENERATOR
EC : ELECTRONIC DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEM
JU .. LMhLOC, A;T'4.[Mi- O t CYCLLS X 94 DL) ISI(_N
K r.. L Lt LR L- -n[)( IN
Figure 16
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Failure Probability per year(X)
T LOGARITHMIC 3 x 5 CYCLES
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Figure 24, cont'd...
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-5 ^ -5 2 -10
of 1.85 x 10 (mean p - 2.3 x 10 , 2 = 2.97 x 10 ), S2
-8 -7 2 -14
a median of 5.25 x 10 (mean- = 1.01 x 10 , c = 2.77 x 10 )
and S3 a median of 6.61 x 10 - 7 (mean = 3.27 x 10, 2 2.529 x 10 ).
Results of the DPD code output are shown in Tables XXII - XXIV.
D. Comparison of DPD Uncertainty Treatment with Method-of-Moments
Two methods were used to compute the overall system failure
probability due to seismic events. One was to take each cutset's
individual fragility function and combine it,using DPD arithmatic,
with the seismicity curve and then combine each of these distributions
together, and the other was to first combine all the cutset fragility
curves together, using the Method-of-Moments to obtain the system
fragility curves (see Figure 25), and then combine this with the
seismicity curves to obtain the overall system failure probability
due to seismic events. Results showed a small discrepancy in the
values computed for the mean and variance of the final system
failure probability (TABLE XXV) between the two approaches.*
V. Summary/Conclusions
The MOBB code was extended to include uncertainty on the
calculation of individual cutset unavailabilities using both Monte
Carlo and Method-of-Moments methods. The Method-of-Moments was
found most efficient and was implemented in the final code version.
A second method for computing system unavailability due to common
causes was developed employing the concepts used most often in nuclear
risk assessments for external event analysis, particularly for seismic
risk. Both approaches must be further tested and compared before a














































































































Results of DPD Code on FPS Problem
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COMPARISON OF APPROACHES FOR COMBINING
CUTSET FRAGILITY (SUSCEPTIBILITY) CURVES
Method 1:
Method 2:
-Established seismic frequency curves
-Specified components' fragility functions
-Compute components' failure probability distribution
functions (DPD)
-Compute system failure probability distribution
using the DPD method
-7
Mean = 1.52 x 10-7 /yr
Var = 2.09 x 1014
Mean to standard deviation ratio = 1.0514
-Sei smicity curves
-Components' fragility functions
-Use the Method-of-Moments to find the system fragility
functions
-Compute system unavailability distribution function (DPD)
108
Mean = 7.14 x 10 /yr
Var = 5.09 x 1015
Mean to standard deviation ratio = 1.0008
-------illc------rm~L1-; rmuruU ~_YI - ~ielu~- -~ X..
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recommendation can be made as to which is preferable. Simple problems
demonstrating the use of each approach were made, but work must
be done to gather further experience on more realistic, large utility
systems before firm conclusions can be drawn on the final usefulness
of each approach.
A follow-up project has been proposed (see Appendix F.4) to
accomplish these goals.
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APPENDIX A: Mathematical Formula
A.1 The Method of Moments
The method of moments is one of the methods to
propagate uncertainty by calculate the moments of the
system distribution from the moments of the component
distributions. The equations of evaluating the moments of
the system distribution can be derived from the multivariated
Taylor series expansion of the system function.
Let the system function F, which has n independent
variables X1 , X2 , ... X
F = f(X1, X2 , ... Xn) (Al)
The Taylor series expansion of the function F about
the mean values X1 , X2  Xn
F = f(X 1 2' X n
6f 6f(XI-X ) + (X 2-X2 )' + .. +1 1 2X 2 2 6X
1 262f 2 62 fX(X1 1 + (X2-X2) 62 +
2(X1- ) (
(X -X ) 6 +
n n 6X
n
+ (X -X )2n n
62
1 36 f
... 3 + 6[ (X 1 1 X
1
= f(X ... ) +  1 (X.-X.) +
1' 2' n =1 6X. 1
n 2
Si[ 1X- (Xii-X )
6X.i
n-1 n 62 f
+ 2 E E - X -. )(X.-X] +
i=1 j=i-1
(A2)
E ~_~^i~ IIYrYIIIIIIC-I. i VII~.--I-LI~-aEIU 1^X11~
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with all derivatives evaluated at the point (1, X2, ... , X).
The Taylor expansion for n independent variables can
be written in symbolic form
St m  n
f (X) = E 
_ [ E a




where l = (Xi-)A convenient vector form is:
A convenient vector form is:
(r+a ) = rm=
m=0O
]m f (Xk) IXk=Xk
(a*v)m . (r
The mean of F is the expectation value of F
E[F] = f(R1, X2 , ... Xn)
n 2f
+ 2 - E[(X i
i= aX
n-1 n 2 f
+ E E E[(X.i-.)(X.-X.)] +
i.=1 j=i+l 6 X.6 X. L Jj 1
The variance var(Xi) = E[(Xi-X i) ] = E[X 2] - E[Xi 2
The covariance cov(Xi ,X) = E[(Xi-X i)(X -r j)]
= ij [var(X i ) var(X)]
where P.. is the correlation coefficient of X. and X.1j 3
-i <  P. 1
- ij -







The variance of F is the second moment about the mean:
var(F) = E[F 2 ] - (E[F]) 2
n-1 n 2
= f ) var(X.) + 2 E Ecov(X i, ) ... (A7)
i=1 1X i=1 j=i+l 6X.6X.
When fault tree method is used for analyzing system
failure probability the system equation is often expressed in sum of
product form. Two special cases where F is either the sum or the
product of its component distributions.
Case 1




(A9)E[F] = i X.i=1 1
Variance
var(F) = E var(X.) +
i=1
n-i n
2 Z E cov(Xi,X.)
i=l j=i+l J
Case 2
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For a system consists of two independent nad
uncorrelated events X1 and X2, the above equations can be
written as the following.
Case 1
F = X1 + X2
E[F] = 1 +  2
var(F) = var(X1) + var(X2 )
F = X1X 2
E[F] = X1X 2
2 2






A.2 The Method of Discrete Probability Distributions [Al]
A discrete probability distribution can be defined
by a set of doublets
[(P1 'X1 )'(P2 'x2)' "" ',(Pn ,x )] (A18)
where 1,X2 ... xn are the discrete values of the variable x
and P1'P2' ... 'Pn are the probability associated with each
xi . The discrete probability distribution can be written as
[(Pixi)] and
ii Pi = 1 (A19)
A.2.1 General Rule of Probability Arithmetic
If z = f(x,y) (A20)
where x and y are independent DPDs
x = [(Pi,xi)]
y = [(qj,y )]
then z is a DPD
z = [(r..ij,zij)] (A21)
where rij = piqj
and z.. = f(x ,yj)
note 
.Er i j = 1ij
Generalize to the case of more than two arguments
in f
12 M
z = f(x ,x , ... , x ) (A22)
where each xm is a DPD
x = [(pi 'i )] (A23)
m m
Then z is a DPD
z = [(r. ,z )]
1. M 1i ...iM
M m
where r. =iM P.
1 " m=1 im
1
z. = f(x. 2 M,x i  ... )
2 M
Probabilistic Addition
z = x + y
x = [(pixi)]
y = [(qj,yj)]
and the DPDs x and y are independent, then z is a DPD0,








and the DPDs x and y are independent, then z is a DPD
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A.2.2 Properties of Probabilistic Operations
Non Distributive
x(y+z) xy + xz (A31)
Probabilistic multiplication is not distributive
because the product DPDs on the right hand of the expression
are not independent.
Dependence
When z = x + x or z = xx (A32)
The rule for probabilistic addition is no longer
applicable because the independent assumption is not valid
in this case. Instead the above expressions can be written
as
z = 2x , z = x (A33)
Condensation Operation
Suppose z = x + y, the number of doublets in z
is the product of the numbers of doublets of x and y. A
condensation operation is used to reduce the number of
doublets after each probabilistic operation.
Suppose (pi,zi),(Pi+l,zi+l) ..(pI,zi) all lie
within a single interval,m. Then these doublets can be
aggregated into a new doublet (m ,m )I m
where jm . pj (A34)
I
= E P.z. (A35)
m Pm j=i J J
Distribution [A2]
Definition
A positive variate x (O<x<w) such that y = log(x)
is normally distributed with mean p and variance a.
Sl(,,o) =x ~ -exp[(log(x)-p)/(-2 2 ) ] x>0O
= 0 otherwise (A36)
The mth moment about the origin
=fm Sl(x,, ) dx








= exp[ + a2/2]
= exp[2 P + a2] {exp[ a ] - 1]}
mode
Smedian
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A.3 Log-Normal
Figure A. 1
If cq are the percentiles of order q of S (x,p,), vq are the percentiles
of order q of the normal distribution N(0,1)
q =qexp[+ VqC] (A42)
Cumulative Distribution Function
cdf[ Sl(i,,a) ] = f0 S1(x,P,a) dx
= ( + erf(z)) i >e"
= ( - erfjz) x <e (A43)
where z log() - p
a /2
Theorem A.1: Reproductive Property
If X1 and X2 are independent log-normal variates, then the
product X1X2 is Sl(x 1+o2,' 1 f 2) The reproductive property extends
to any finite set of independent log-normal variates and also to an
infinite sequence provided that some conditions of convergnece are
fulfilled.
Theorem A.2: Central Limit Theorem
If [Xj] is a sequence of independent, positive variates
having the same probability distribution and such that
E[log(X .)] = P
and var[log(X.)] = o'
both exist, then the product jI Xj is asymptotically distributed as
S1(xI n , no2 ).
Estimation of Parameters
There are five types of methods to estimate the parameters
and
i) the method of maximum likelihood,
ii) the method of moments,
iii) the method of quantiles,
iv) the graphical method, and
v) mixed methods.
Suppose there is given a sample Sn of size n consisting
observations xl, x2, ..., xn
The jth sample moments about the origin is denoted by 1 .
1. x (A44)
n i=1 i
The Method of Maximum Likelihood
The likelihood function of the sample is
1 1 n 2
n( 2 1n n exp[ - n (log xi -.,)2n(27 X 2 02 i=l (A45)
and the maxirnm-likelihood estimators m and s of P and a are found
to be
m = n log xi (A46)
n =
2 1 n 2
s (log x. - m)
=n i=l (A47)
The estimator s is biased but consistent; if, however, the
following equation is used
2 1 n 2
s =- (log x. - m) (A48)
n-i i=1
then m and s are mininnu variance tnbiascd estintirs of ), and c.
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The Graphical Method
The graphical method was discussed in the last section.
The estimators m and s can be obtained from the logarithmic probability
graph.
The Mixed Method
The estimators m and s are obtained from a combination
of different methods discussed above.
Estimates of a and B2, the mean and variance of the log-
normal distribution may be derived from estimates of P and a2obtained
by the methods discussed above.
Example
The DPD of S2 taken from the sample problem discussed in
Chapter 5 are used as sample values in this example. From Figure A.2:
16 % = 1.2 x 10
- 8
x50 % = 4.6 x 10- 8
x,= 1.8 x 10-7
and dervied
m = log(4.6 x 10-8)
= -9.9869
s = 1.3541
where m and s are the estimators-of P and a .
The Method of Moments
The estimators m and s of and are obtained by equating
the first two sample moments 1' and 12 to the expressions
11 = exp[m + s 2 1 (A49)
12 = exp[2m + 2s 2] (A50)
whence
m = 2 log(l) - log(l2) (A51)
and s = log(l1) - 2 log(l') (A52)
The Method of Percentiles
To obtain percentile estimators the sample percentiles of
order ql and q2 are set equal to the expressions
Xql = exp[m + vqls ]  (A53)
and Xq2 = exp[m + vq2 s ] (A54)
t 21og(x) - qllog(xq2)
so that m = q q q2 (A54)
V q2 
- ql
log(xq2 ) - log(x )(A55)
V q2 
- ql
Testing for Lognormality and Estimation of Parameters
Testing for Lognormality
Any test of normality may be adapted, by using transformed
sample values, as a test of lognormality. In this section only the use
of logarithmic probability paper is discussed.
It is a fairly accurate graphical method by the use of
logarithmic probability paper. The theory underlying its use is derived
from the relation which connects the percentile of order q of S1(x , )
and the corresponding percentile of N(0,1)
log ( q) = av + p
so that the locus of [v q,log(C )] is a straight line.
Although the use of the method can hardly be regarded as a
rigorous statistical test of logpormality it nevertheless provides a
quick judging whether the population may be lognormal. Moreover, the
parameters P and a may be estimated from a straight line fitted by
eye to the points. The population percentiles of orde'r 16, 50 and 84%
are given by
C16% = exp(P - o)
C50% = exp(p)
and C84% = exp(v + o)
so that u = log( 50%)
50% C84%
and a = log[ ( 5+ - 8)]
p16% 50%/
Two advantages of the graphical methods are transformation of
sample values is not required and group intervals do not affect the results.
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A.4 Truncated Log-normal Distribution
The truncated log-normal distribution is a special form of
the log-normal distribution. The x variate is limited from 0 to 1.
St(xI,G) = C exp[(log x - P)2/(202)] 0< x< I
xo/2n
= 0 otherwise (A56)
where C is the normalization factor
-1 1C- = 1 S1(xi,Pa) dx(A57)
the mth moment about the origin
Im
= x St(xlp,o) dx (A58)
Mean = xS (xI,) dx (A59)
Variance = E[x 2 - E[x] 2
= [f 0 x 2S(xhI,)dx] - [ xS )dx  (A60)
Unlike the log-normal probability distribution, th' mth moment of
truncated log-normal probability distribution had to be evaluated
numerically. Also there is a discontinuity at x = 0.
lim S t (xI,o) = E (non-zero) (A61)
x 4 1
lim St(xIP ,o ) = 0 (A62)
x + 1
A.5
Bounded Log-normal Probability Distribution [A3]
It is possible to introduce an extension of the log-normal
distribution to allow for both a lower and an upper bound to the
possible values of the variate. Johnson [A3] had discussed the use






such that x' is log-normally distributed.
The bomunded log-normal distribution used in this study
is a specialized form of the above distribution. The x variate is
confined to the range 0 <x<1, that is
T =0
0 =1 (A64)













= E[(x 2 )] - E[(x)] 2
1 2Sb(X











p + V q]
(A70)
exp[
= 1 exp-[(log( x  )
x(l-x)o27 -x
1+exp[ p+v q]
A.6- The Asymptotic Distribution of the Maximum for
Log-normal Distribution [A3,A4]
A distribution which can be obtained as the limit
distribution of a properly normalized extreme of independent
and identically distributed random variables.
For log-normal distribution, the cdf(x)
logx .2
F(x) = _ exp[-u /2] du x>0 (A71)
Then the asymptotic distribution of maximum
cdf(x) = F*(x)
(A72)
F*(x) = exp[-e ]
-= < X <W,
a < 0
- < B < 00
The probability density function (pdf)
SaF*(x)-a(x-)
f*(x) = F*(x) aexp[-a(x-8)-e (B ]
ax
The mean value of x and the variance are







NUmerical integration using the Simpson's












(x -x )(x -x )(x2-x1)(X1-X3)
(x-x1 ) (x-x2 )
+ f




















x I x2 x
(x 2 +x 1 x 3 -x 1 x-x 3x)
(x2 +x1x2-x1x-x2x)
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3  2+ [(x3 + x 1 +x 1 ( 3x2-x 3 )-3(x 3-x2 ) S(x 1 +x2
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Appendix B: Figures and Tables of the Moments of Sb, SL and St.
Progranme Listings of BORO, LORO and TORO.
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Figure Bl: The first four moments, variances and E[(Xi i) ] of the
bounded log-normal distribution Sb. (19 Sheets)
(Sheet 1 of 19)
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Figure B2: The first four moments, variances and E[(Xi-Xi) ] of the
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Table Bl: The First Four Moments, Variances and E[(Xi-.) 4] of the
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Table B2: The first four moments, variances and E[(Xi-Xi) ] of the
log-normal distribution S. (4 Sheets)
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Table B3: The first four moments, variances and E[(Xi-X.) ] of the
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Table B4: Programme listing of BORO. (4 Sheets)
Sb(Sheet 1 of 4)
c ------------- 
----------------------------------- 
b(he 1 of 4)
c programme to evaluate moments of bounded log-
c normal distribution















if(xlm.eq.O.O.or.xls.eq.O.O) go to 10
do 30 k=1,4
xm (k) =xmom (k,xlm,xls)
30 continue
xm (5)=xm (2) -xm (1) **2
xm(6)=xm(4)-4.*xm(3)*xm()+6.*xm(2)*xm(1)**2-3.*xm() **4
























C --I------ -- ----------------------------
c routine to calculate bounded log-normal pdf
c ---------------------------------------"""'
data pi/3.141592654/
if(x.le.0.0.or.x.ge.1.0) go to 100
y=(alog(x/(1.-x))-xlm)**2/(-2.*xls**2)
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Sb(Sheet 2 of 4)
function xmom(m,xlm,xls)
c ----------------------









x -exp (b) / (1.+exp (b))
xm=xmode (m,xlm,xl s)
if(xm.ge.1.0) go to 100



















































routine to find the maximum of the function
g(x)=(x**m)*f(x) by solving g'(x)-O using
the Newton-Raphson's method















if (abs(yt2).It.xlimit) go to 100
ct=(yt-yt2)/yt






















first derivative of the function
g (x) = (x**m) *f (x)
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Sb(Sheet 4 of 4)second derviative of the function
g (x)- (x**m) *f (x)







------~~~~------ ---- ---- --- ---- ---- ---- ---
routine to print page heading











Table B5: Programme listing of LORO (2 Sheets)
S]
programme to evaluate moments of log-
normal distribution


















xm (5) -xm (2) -xm(1) **2
xm (6) =xm (4) -4.*xm (3) *xm (1)+6.*xm (2) ,*xm (1) **2-3.*xm (1) **4
write(6,100)xr,ef (j), (xm(ii),iinl,6)





















routine to calculate log-normal pdf
data pi/3.141592654/
if(x.le.0.0) go to 100
y= (a log(x)-xlm) **2/(-2.*xls**2)
if(y.lt.-87.2) go to 100






l(Sheet 1 of 2)
/
S1(Sh eet 2 of 2)---------------------------------------------------
routine to calculate the m th moment









routine to print page heading
data np/l/
write (6, 100) np
100 format(lhl,t72, 'page: ',i3)
write (6,200)
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Table B6: Programmne listing of TORO (4 Sheets)
S t(Sheet 1 of 4)
c ----------------------------------------------- S t














xr=rj (i) *fr (jj)
do 20 j=1,13
call conv(xr,ef (j),xlm,xls,c)




xm (5) =xm (2) -xm(1) **2
xm (6) =xm (4)-4.*xm(3) *xm () +6.*xm (2) *xm () **2-3.*xm () **4










c -------- -------- ------- --V --- -------- -------
c routine to calculate log mean and log deviation














C -------------,,, ,, ,,, ----- -- - - -- - -- - - -- - -- - -
c routine to calculate truncated log-normal pdf
----------------------------------------------------c
data pi/3.141592654/
if(x.le.0.0.or.x.gt.1.0) go to 100
y=(alog(x)-xlm)*'*2/(-2.*xls**2)
if(y.lt.-60.0) go to 100
xjb=exp (y) / (x*xls* (2.*pi) **.5)
return
100 xjb=0.0
_L LI. - ( .__ill-L- X-~-I~U L~




c routine to calculate the normalization factor



























































if(m.eq.0) go to 50
xu=1.0
x)=exp (b)
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return St(Sheet 4 of 4)
end
subroutine prt(nl)
routine to print page heading
-------------------------.-.----------------
data np/l/
write (6, 100) np
100 format (lhl,t72, 'page: ', i3)
write(6,200)






APPENDIX C: Automatic Pressure Relief System Description
APPENDIX C: Automatic Pressure Relief System (APR) Description
C.1.1 Purpose
The purpose of the automatic pressure relief (APR) system is
to provide a backup method for reducing reactor pressure rapidly
in the event of feedwater coolant injection system failure.
Since each of the four APR valves also functions as a safety
valve, they are additionally able to prevent the reactor vessel
pressure safety limit of 1375 psig from being exceeded. All
together, there are six valves that perform this safety/relief
valve function.
C.1.2 Description and Configuration
The fbur APR valves are considered dual purpose since they
are self-actuating at the set relieving pressure and are air
operated at pressures below the setpoint, which permits remote
manual or automatic opening.
The dual valve consists of two main sections (see Figure
C.1 ). The pilot valve section is a relatively small self-
actuated relief valve, integral with the main valve, which pro-
vides pressure sensing and main valve control functions. The
main element of this pilot valve is a precision machined spring-
bellows, the expansion of which accurately controls pilot valve
opening pressure. The main relief-safety valve section is a
hydraulically-operated, reverse-seated globe valve which, when
actuated by the pilot valve via the second stage disk, provides
the pressure relief function. Thus, the four APR valves are
capable of functioning (see Figure C.2 ) as safety/relief valves
opening automatically at the following setpoints:
1) APR valve MS-3A opens at 1095 psig
2) APR valve MS-3D opens at 1110 psig
3) APR valves MS-3C and MS-3F open at 1125 psig
In addition, the two remaining safety/relief valves which are not
capable of automatic remote actuation open at 1125 psig.
When the APR valves operate in the remote actuation mode,
the air operator performs the function of the pilot valve sec-
tion, causing the second stage disk to open. This results in
main valve actuation, as shown in Figure C.2 *, similar to the
safety mode except here the pilot valve remains closed.
The APR system is capable of operation without reliance on
off-site power or station air. Control power to the air operator
solenoid is supplied by redundant 125 volt DC power sources, and
sufficient air is stored in emergency accumulators for several
valve cycling operations.
APR valves MS-3A, 3C, 3D, and 3F are located on horizontal
sections of main steam lines A, C, B, and D, respectively. The
two safety/relief valves MS-3B and 3E are similarly installed on
steam lines B and C. Each valve discharge is piped through its
own discharge line to a point below the water level in the
primary containment suppression pool (torus) to permit steam to
condense in the pool. Each exhaust line is equipped with a
vacuum relief valve to prevent drawing water-up into the line due
to steam condensation following termination of operation.
C.1.3 System Interfaces
See attached Table C.1
C.1.4 Instrumentation and Control
Automatic actuation of the APR system requires coincident
indication of reactor water lo-lo level and high drywell pres-
sure, as well as persistance of the lo-lo water level signal for
two minutes. An interlock prevents actuation of the APR function
until the discharge pressure of at least one LPCI or core spray
pump exceeds 100 psig. This ensures that the system will not
operate until the low pressure ECCS pumps are running. System
instrumentation is listed in Table
The actuation logic consists of two redundant trip systems,
either of which is capabale of initiating auto blowdown upon
receipt of the accident signal. Each of these trip systems is
further d,ivided into two trip logic channels. Both channels
within a given trip system must actuate in order to initiate the
trip system logic. A channel consists of lo-lo reactor water
level instrumentation, high drywell pressure instrumentation and
an a ECCS "pump running" interlock, all in series with each
other. Since every core spray and LPCI pump has two pressure
switches on its discharge side, each switch acts as an interlock
on one of the two trip channels.
A time delay circuit is located in series with one of the
trip logic channels in each trip system to allow time for the
FWCI system to achieve proper operation. If the FWCI system
maintai.ns water level in the reactor vessel, the blowdown circuit
is de-energized and the automatic blowdown signal is blocked.
If, however, the FWCI system fails to deliver sufficient flow,
the blowdown actuates upon termination of the time delay (two
minutes). The APR system initiation logic is shown in Figure
The time delay also provides surveillance time so that the
operator can evaluate possible spurious activation signals and
override them if necessary. A permissive signal from the time
delay circuit serves as the confirming signal to activate the APR
valves when the control station switch is in the automatic
position. Manual blowdown of the reactor vessel is accomplished
independently of the automatic circuitry.
The automatic pressure relief system is provided with
redundant power supplies to each auto-relief valve and auto
blowdown trip system. Upon loss of the primary DC power supply
to these circuits, automatic transfer to an alternate DC power
supply will be accomplished. Hence, the pressure relief system
will be maintained for both manual and automatic operation in the
event that a station battery is lost.
C.1.5 Testing
There are two primary tests of the APR system, SP 413B and
SP 413C, which are conducted during each refueling outage
(approximately every 12,000 hours), and three related tests which
are performed monthly to check the function and calibration of
the accident detection instrumentation. Bench testing of the
safety/relief valves is performed during each refueling outage,
and functional tests are performed at normal and low reactor
operating pressures.
SP 413B Auto Blowdown Logic Test
One of the objectives of this test is to verify the
logic sequence of the automatic blowdown (APR) system
by simulated auto-initiation. A simulated accident
signal is placed separately on each of the four trip
logic channels (two channels per' trip system). The
test is considered to be satisfactory if each channel
actuates as required. In addition, the two trip
channels having time delay circuits must actuate a
"blowdown" at or less than 120 seconds from initi-
ation.
The other objective of this test is to verify auto-
transfer of DC control power to the alternate sobrce
upon loss of the primary. Fuses are pulled on the
primary DC power supply and successful transfer to
the alternate supply, along with control room panel
annunciation is checked. This test is performed on
both auto-blowdown trip system power supplies as well
as each auto-relief valve solenoid power supply.
SP 413C Automatic Actuation of Automatic Pressure Relief
Subsystem
The objective of this test is to verify that a
simulated auto-initiation signal will open all four
APR valve solenoids. A simulated accident signal is
placed on both trip logic channels of trip system
"A". A successful test occurs if after 120 seconds
the green APR indicating lights on control room panel
903 go out and the red indicating light comes on,
indicating power to the APR actuation solenoid.
SP 413A LP Core Cooling Pump Interlock Functional and
Calibration Test
The objective of this monthly test is to check the
function of the LPCI and core spray pump interlock
pressure sensors, and calibrate them if necessary.
The test is considered to be satisfactorily completed
provided the switches trip at 100 psig (+ 10 psig).
SP 412C Reactor Low Low Water Level Functional and
Calibration Test
The objective of this monthly test is to determine if
the four water level switches (as listed in Table
C.2 ) will trip at the setpoint of 79" above the top
of the active fuel, and to calibrate them if
necessary.
SP 412D High Drywell Pressure Functional and Calibration Test
The objective of this monthly test is to demonstrate
that the four drywell pressure detection switches (as
__~_~1__1__ 
listed in Table C.2 ) will trip at a pressure less
than or equal to 2 psig.
SP 626.2 Manual Operation of Relief Valves When at Low
Pressure
Once during each refueling cycle each safety/relief
valve must be manually operated while the reactor is
at low pressure.
SP 626.3 Manual Operation of Relief Valves when at Operating
Pressure
The safety/relief valves are to be opened, one at a
time, while the reactor is at operating pressure.
There is no set interval for the performance of this
test.
SP 778.1 Inspection of Safety/Relief Valves
During each refueling outage one safety/relief valve
is disassembled and inspected.
SP 778.2 Benc Check of Safety/Relief Valves
During each refueling outage three of the six safety/
relief valves "top-works" ar& bench tested. All six
valves are tested during a span of two refuelings.
C.1.6 Maintenance
The four APR valves and the two safety/relief valves are
maintained in accordance with the surveillance requirements
spelled out by the Technical Specifications. At each refueling
outage, three of the six valves have their "top works" either
bench checked or replaced with bench checked "top works," so' that
all six valves are maintained by the end of two refueling outages
(approx. 24,000 hours). In addition, at least one of the six
valves is disassembled and inspected during each refueling outage
so that all of the valves will be overhauled by the end of six
refueling outages, at most.
C.1.7 Technical Specifications
The limiting conditions for operation require that all six
safety/relief valves be operable in the safety valve mode
whenever'reactor pressure and temperature are greater than 90
psig and 3200F, respectively. Failure of any one valve to
operate in this mode (as a safety valve) mandates cold shutdown
within 24 hours. The same limiting condition for operation
applies to the four safety/relief valves functioning in the
automatic pressure relief mode, with the following exception.
Reactor operation is allowed for a period of 7 days with one of
the APR valves inoperable, provided that the remaining APR
valves, the FWCI system and the gas turbine generator are all
operable. If the inoperable APR valve cannot be repaired within
that time, the reactor is required to be in cold shutdown as
stated earlier.
The surveillance requirements similarly address the dual
function of the six safety/relief valves. All six valves must be
opened manually, with the reactor at low pressure, once during
each operating cycle to demonstrate operability in the safety
valve mode. Additional surveillance requirements regarding valve
maintenance have already been discussed in the preceding section,
C.1.6 .
Surveillance of the four APR valves includes all of the
requirements stated for the safety valve mode. Additionally,
during each operating cycle a simulated automated initiation of
the system, excluding actual valve opening, is performed. Also,
if one APR valves is found to be inoperable, the actuation logic
of the remaining APR valves, the FWCI system, and the gas turbine
generator must be demonstrated to be operable on a daily basis.
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C.1.8 Operation
The APR system operates automatically to depressurize the
reactor whenever the FWCI system is unable to maintain proper
vessel water inventory under accident conditions. The system is
actuated upon indication of high drywell pressure coincident with
a 120 second persistant low reactor water level signal, and if at
least one LPCI or core spray pump is running.
If the APR control switch is not in the automatic position
or if there is a failure in the automatic actuation logic, the
system can be operated manually from the 903 control room panel.
Each of the four safety/relief valves that operates in the remote
automatic actuation mode is clearly identified by a large "APR"
label under its control switch. Next to the control switch lay-
out is another label which keys the operator to the manual relief
valve opening sequence. Unlike the remote automatic actuation
mode all six saftey/relief valves may be opened manually. Actual
APR valve opening has al.ready been discussed in section
C.2 Analysis
C.2.1 Success/Failure Criteria
Three modes of operation were considered for the safety/
relief valves. A fault tree was constructed for the APR system
which utilizes four of the six safety/relief valves. Addition-
ally, the pressure relief function and manual depressurization
operation were examined.
Successful operation of the APR system requires that two out
of the four APR valves operate to blowdown the reactor vessel
when required to do so. Loss of two of the relief valves does
not materially affect the pressure relieving
capability.
System failure occurs whenever three of the four APR valves
fail to open when demanded. However, since all six safety/relief
valves can be remotely operated by the reactor operator, five out
of six would have to fail if manual recovery were considered.
To perform the pressure relief function four of the six
safety/relief valves must open to relieve reactor vessel pressure.
Failure of three of the four valves was analyzed and it was determined
that the system failure probability was sufficiently negligable.
Failure of the system in the manual depressurization mode,
requiring that three of the six safety/relief valves do not open,
is dominated by operator failure to initiate manual depressurization.
A THERP analysis has been performed for this event.
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Table C.2 Component Unavailability Data (11 Sheets)
WV '
FAULT SUMMARY SHEETS
EVENT DESCRIPTION DETECTION INTERVAL COMIENTS UNAVAILABILITY
-3
MS-3A-PHV-FTO APR valve fails 12000 hrs Tested as per 1x10 3




203-3A-FTE APR valve solenoid 12000 hrs Tested when valve 1.7x10 3




203-3A-SOV-FTO Solenoid operated 12000 hrs Tested when valve 1.7x10 2
203-3C-SOV-FTO air valve fails (detected during cycled in SP 626.2
203-3D-SOV-FTO to open refueling outages)
203-3F-SOV-FTO
-4
932287-109A-2RC Relay contacts fail 12000 hrs Auto actuation of 6x10
932287-109C-2RC to remain closed (detected during APR subsystem as






932287-109A-FRE Failure of relay 12000 hrs Auto blowdown logic 6x10 4
932287-109C-FRE coil to remain (detected during test as per SP 413B







EVENT DESCRIPTION DETECTION INTERVAL COMMENTS UNAVAILABILITY
287-703A-FUS-LOF Failure of fuses on Prompt "Fuse Monitor" annun- 2.4x10-5







DC-11A2-21-FRC Local faults on Prompt Annunciated in the 2.4x10-5
breaker control room
932287-109A-3FC Relay contacts fail 12000 hrs Auto blowdown logic 1.8x10-3







287-707A-FUS-LOF Failure of fuses on 12000 hrs Auto blowdown logic 6x10-3















EVENT DESCRIPTION DETECTION INTERVAL COMMENTS UNAVAILABILITY
-3
932287-106A-FTE Relay coil fails 12000 hrs Auto blowdown logic 1.7x103
932287-105A-FTE to energize (detected during test as per SP 413B
932287-104A-FTE refueling outages) and auto actuation
932287-103A-FTE of APR subsystem
as per SP 413C tests
these relay coils
932287-106A-3FC Relay contacts fail 12000 hrs Auto actuation of 1.8x10-3
932287-106A-5FC to close (detected during APR subsystem as







903287-302-1RC) A Failure of reset 12000 hrs Auto blowdown logic 1.8x10 4
903287-302-5RC switch or contact (detected during test as per SP 413B.
903287-302-9RC pair to remain refueling outages) Procedure SP 413C
903287-302-DRC will also test "A"
-5
903287-302-FRD logic contact pairs 6.3x10
yearly
903287-302-OER Operator resets APR No detection. Reset of timer 3x10 -3
903287-303-OER actuation logic interval will delay auto
during accident actuation by 120sec
932287-108A-2RC Failure of relay One month Tests on hi drywell 3.6x10-5
932287-108A-1RC contacts to remain pressure sensors and
932287-108B-2RCo closed AC interlocks as per






EVENT DESCRIPTION DETECTION INTERVAL COMMENTS UNAVAILABILITY
932287-108A-FRE Failure of relay 12000 hrs Auto blowdown logic 6x10 -4
932287-108B-FRE coil to remain (detected during test as per SP 413B
energized refueling outages)
-5
287-701A-FUS-LOF Failure of fuses Immediate "Fuse monitor" 2.4x10 5
287-702A-FUS-LOF on prime DC - annunciator on
287-701B-FUS-LOF supply CRP 903
287-702B-FUS-LOF
932287-108A-4FC Relay contacts fail 12000 hrs Auto blowdown logic 1.8x10-3
932287-108A-3FC to close (detected during test as per. SP 413B
932287-108B-4FC refueling outages)
932287-108B-3FC
287-706A-FUS-LOF Failure of fuses 12000 hrs Auto blowdown logic 6x10-3
287-705A-FUS-LOF on alternate D.C. (detected during test as per SP 413B
287-706B-FUS-LOF supply refueling outages)
287-705B-FUS-LOF
-4
932287-112A-FTE Relay coil fails One month LPCI/LPCS 1x10
9321530-147-FTE to energize pump interlock





9321530-147-1FC Relay contacts fail One month LPCI/LPCS pump 1x10
9331530-247-2FC to close interlock test as









EVENT DESCRIPTION DETECTION INTERVAL COMMENTS UNAVAILABILITY
DC-11A2-23-FRC Local faults One month LPCI/1LPCS pump 3.6x10 "4
DC-11A2-20-FRC on breaker interlock test as
DC-11AI-25-FRC per SP 413A
DC-1IAI-26-FRC
2201A150182A-XFC Contacts fail to One month LPCI/LPCS pump 1.4x10 4
2201A150182C-XFC close on pressure interlock test as




2201A150182A-TOM Pressure switch One month LPCI/LPCS pump 1x10 2
2201A150182C-TOM o.o.s. as a result interlock test as
2201B150182B-TOM of test or mainten- per SP 413A
2201B150182D-TOM ance (i.e. not
LCLPS-1462C-TOM restored to service)
LCLPS-1462D-TON
,, -3
2201A150182A-OMC Pressure switch One month LPCI/LPCS pump 1x10 3
2201A150182C-OMC miscalibrated interlock test as








CS-PUMP-A-OFF Core spray pump N/A Conditional






EVENT DESCRIPTION DETECTION INTERVAL COMMENTS UNAVAILABILITY
932287-101A-FTE Relay coil fails to One month Hi drywell pressure 1x10-4
932287-101B-FTE energize sensor test as per
932287-102A-FTE SP 412D
932287-102B-FTE
932287-101A-1FC Relay contacts fail None (assume 105 SP 412D only checks 3x10- 2
932287-101A-3FC to close hrs) if relay energizes,







903287-303-1RC Failure of reset None (105 hrs Part of seal-in 3x10 -3
903287-303-5RC switch contacts to assumed) circuit which is
903287-303-9RC remain closed never tested
903287-303-DRC separately
903287-303-FRD Reset switch fails to None (10 hrs Never specifically 1x10
remain closed assumed) tested
2205PS-1620A-XFC Failure of pressure One month Hi drywell pressure 1.4x10-4-
2206PS-1620B-XFC switch contacts to sensor test as per







EVENT DESCRIPTION DETECTION INTERVAL COMMENTS UNAVAILABILITY
-2
2205PS-1620A-TOM Pressure switch One month Sensor tested as 1x10 2
2206PS-1620B-TOM O.O.S. as a result per SP 412D
2205PS-1620C-TOM of test or maint.
2206PS-1620D-TOM (i.e. not restored
to service)
-3
2205PS-1620A-OMC Pressure switch One month Sensor tested as 1x10 3
2206PS-1620B-OMC miscalibrated per SP 412D
2205PS-1620C-OIC
2206PS-1620D-OMC
NO-HI-DRYWL-PRES Drywell pressure N/A Conditional events
< 2 PSIG
NO-LO-RX-H20-LVL Rx water level
> 79" above TAF
-4
9321430-106A-FTE Relay coil fails One month Rx lo lo water level 1x10
9321430-106B-FTE sensor test as per
9321430-107A-FTE SP 412C
9321430-107B-FTE
9321430-106A-5FC Relay contacts fail None (assume 105 SP 412C only checks 3x10-2
9321430-106B-5FC to close hrs) for relay coil ener-
9321430-107A-5FC gizing not contact








EVENT DESCRIPTION DETECTION INTERVAL COMMENTS UNAVAILABILITY
-Watci aevi ch One month Rx lo lo water 
level 1.4x10 4
nas a osensor tes as per
2205263-72C2-XFC close SP 412C
2206263-72D2-XFC
2205263-72A2-TOM Water level sensor One month Rx low water level 1x10-2
2206263-72B2-TOM O.O.S. as result sensor test as per
2205263-72C2-TOM of test or maint. SP 412C
2206263-72D2-TOM (i.e. not restored
to service)
2205263-72A2-OHC Water level sensor One month Sensor tested as 1xl1-3
2206263-72B2-OMC miscalibrated per SP 412C
2205263-72C2-OMC
2206263-72D2-OMC
932287-105B-FTE Relay coil fails 12000 hrs Auto blowdown logic 1.7x10-3
932287-104B-FTE to energize (tested during re- test as per SP 413B
932287-103B-FTE fueling outage)
932287-106B-FTE
9321530-147-2FC Relay contacts fail One month LPCI/LPCS pump inter- 1x10 4
9331530-247-IFC to close lock test as per
9321430-132A-2FC SP 413A
9331430-132B-IFC
932287-110A-FTE Relay coil fails One month LPCI/LPCS pump 1x10 4
932287-110B-FTE to energize interlock test as











EVENT DESCRIPTION ..._ DETECTION INTERVAL COIMENTS .. UNAVAILARILITY
9321430-131A-IFC Relay contacts fail One month LPCI/LPCS pump 1.x10 4
9331430-131B-2FC to close interlock test as
9321530-145-IFC per SP 413A
9331530-245-2FC
2201APS1462A-XFC Pressure switch One month LPCI/LPCS pump 1.4x10-4
2201BPS1462B-XFC contacts fail to interlock test as




2201APS1462A-TOM Pressure switch One month LPCI/LPCS pump 1x10- 2
2201APS1462B-TOM O.O.S. due to test interlock test as
2201A150172A-TOM or maint. (i.e. per SP 413A
2201A150172C-TOM not returned to
2201B150172B-TOM service
2201B150172D-TOM
2201APS1462A-OMC Relay contacts fail One month LPCI/LPCS pump 1x10 - 3
2201BPS1462A-OMC to close test as per SP 413A







































932287-105B-1FC Relay contacts fail None Procedures SP 413A & 3x10-2








9331430-106B-5FC Relay contacts fail None SP 412C only checks 3x10
9331430-107B-5FC to close (assume 10 hrs) relay coil not
contact pairs
9331430-106B-FTE Relay coil fails One month Tested during the 1x10 4
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FAULT SUMMARY SHEETS




















































Figure C.3 VALVE SCHEMATIC (CLOSED)
. 3
Front Line System Support System Failure Mode Failure Effect
Components System Components





Air Operator Loss of air
Alr ~'
Emergency air accumulators
* act as back-up air supply;
complete loss of air supply
causes valve to fail as is
(N. C.)
Air valve solenoid
Bus 11A-2 Low or zero
voltage
Auto bus transfer to DC Bus
11A-I valve fails as is (NC)
if bus transfer fails













































APPENDIX D: ADP (Automatic Remote Actuation Mode)
Fault Tree with TOP EVENT - Less Than
Two APR Vilves Operate to Blowdown the




GA01A GA01B GA01C GA1D
GRA GRA GRA GRF
GRF GRF GRD GRD
GRD GRC GRC GRC
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JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 2
JOB DESCRIPTION: SAMPLE PROBLEM: SEISMIC EVENT - WAREHOUSE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (FPS) HADES - VERSION 1 MARCH 1982
. .*.******* ** .****.** ***.********.*** * * * * ** ** * * * * *............................. --------
INPUT DATA TO HADES
S****** ***************************************************************************************************************************
S----+----1----+- -------- --------- 4-------- 5 -------- 6 -------- 7 -------- 8
*DATA SET ONE: COMMON INITIATORS DATA
1
SEISMICITY SE 9
.75000E-01 FTOI -.76000 -2.6632 .0
.15000 FTO1 -.97500 -2.0538 .0
.75000E-01 FTOi -1.1000 -1.8364 .0
.50000E-01 FTOI -.77780 -2.7350 .0
.10000 FTOi -.86250 -2.4913 .0
.50000E-01 FTOI -.93330 -2.3268 .0
.12500 FTOI -.93750 -2.3427 .0
.25000 FTO1 -1.1000 -1.9727 .0
.12500 FTO1 -1.1750 
-1.8404 .0,
*END
---- + ---- 1 -------- 2 ---- +---- 3 ---- +---- 4 -------- 5 -------- 6 -------- 7 -------- 8
*DATA SET TWO: COMPONENT DATA
5
WATER STORAGE TANK TK
SE 5
.20000 FTO2 .57260 .28000 .0
.20000 FTO2 .71380 .28000 .0
.20000 FTO2 .83000 .28000 .0
.20000 FTO2 .96510 .28000 .0




.20000 FTO2 .39740 .15000 .0
.20000 FTO2 .52240 .15000 .0
.20000 FTO2 .63000 .15000 .0
.20000 FTO2 .75970 .15000 .0




.20000 FTO2 .51010 .30000 .0
20000 FTO2 63110 .30000 .0
~--~-. v v .. . . . .
JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 3
JOB DESCRIPTION: SAMPLE PROBLEM: SEISMIC EVENT - WAREHOUSE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (FPS) HADES - VERSION 1 MARCH 1982
..................................................................................................................................
---- +-----1----+----2----+----3--------4 - 5 -------- 6-------- 7 --------
.20000 FTO2 .73000 .30000 .O
.20000 FTO2 .84440 .30000 .0





















































---- +----1----+----2----+----3----+----4-------- 5 - 6 -+---- 7 --------






----------------------- END OF INPUT CARD IMAGES------------------------
JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER 'CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 4
JOB DESCRIPTION: SAMPLE PROBLEM: SEISMIC EVENT - WAREHOUSE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (FPS) HADES - VERSION 1 MARCH 1982
..................................................................................................................................
INPUT SUMMARY
NUMBER OF EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATORS (NCI) ----- 1
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS (NCP) ----------------------- 5
NUMBER OF CUT SETS (NCS) --------------------- 4
0
JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 5
JOB DESCRIPTION: SAMPLE PROBLEM: SEISMIC EVENT - WAREHOUSE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (FPS) HADES - VERSION I MARCH 1982
..................................................................................................................................
COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ABBREVIATIONS
SEISMICITY
JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 6
JOB DESCRIPTION: SAMPLE PROBLEM: SEISMIC EVENT - WAREHOUSE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (FPS) HADES - VERSION i MARCH 1982















JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 7
JOB DESCRIPTION: SAMPLE PROBLEM: SEISMIC EVENT - WAREHOUSE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (FPS) HADES - VERSION 1 MARCH 1982
**************+**** * ************************************************** ******************************************************
OUTPUT FROM HADES
COMPONENT FAILURE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION
COMPONENT: WATER STORAGE TANK (TK)
CAUSE: SEISMICITY (SE)




























































































- - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - -- - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 
8
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JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 9
JOB DESCRIPTION: SAMPLE PROBLEM: SEISMIC EVENT - WAREHOUSE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (FPS) HADES - VERSION 1 MARCH 1982
..................................................................................................................................
OUTPUT FROM HADES
COMPONENT FAILURE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION
COMPONENT: PUMPING TRAIN (PT)
CAUSE: SEISMICITY (SE)



























































































JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 10
JOB DESCRIPTION: SAMPLE PROBLEM: SEISMIC EVENT - WAREHOUSE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (FPS) HADES - VERSION 1 MARCH 1982
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .





















































JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 11
JOB DESCRIPTION: SAMPLE PROBLEM: SEISMIC EVENT - WAREHOUSE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (FPS) HADES - VERSION 1 MARCH 1982
OUTPUT FROM HADES


































































































JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 12





















































JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 13
JOB DESCRIPTION: SAMPLE PROBLEM: SEISMIC EVENT - WAREHOUSE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (FPS) HADES - VERSION 1 MARCH 1982
.. **...***.***...**..*.. .
OUTPUT FROM HADES
COMPONENT FAILURE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION
COMPONENT: DIESEL GENERATOR (DG)
CAUSE: SEISMICITY (SE)



























































































JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 14






















































JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 15





COMPONENT FAILURE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION
COMPONENT: OFF-SITE POWER (OP)
CAUSE: SEISMICITY (SE)



















































































JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS 
PAGE 16
JOB DESCRIPTION: SAMPLE PROBLEM: SEISMIC EVENT - WAREHOUSE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (FPS) HADES 





















































JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 17














































































































JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 18











































JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 19
JOB DESCRIPTION: SAMPLE PROBLEM: SEISMIC EVENT - WAREHOUSE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (FPS) HADES - VERSION I MARCH 1982
..................................................................................................................................
OUTPUT FROM HADES
CUT SET FAILURE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
CUTSET ORDER: 2
2) COMPONENTS: PTA PTB
CAUSE: SEISMICITY (SE)




































































































JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 20











































JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 21




CUT SET FAILURE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
CUTSET ORDER: 2







































































































JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 22
JOB DESCRIPTION: SAMPLE PROBLEM: SEISMIC EVENT - WAREHOUSE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (FPS) HADES - VERSION 1 MARCH 1982

















































JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 23
JOB DESCRIPTION: SAMPLE PROBLEM: SEISMIC EVENT - WAREHOUSE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (FPS) HADES - VERSION 1 MARCH 1982
********t*t** ******** **tat+ ** * *** ****** ************** **************************************************************************
OUTPUT FROM HADES
**********t********* ****************************** .
CUT SET FAILURE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
CUTSET ORDER: 2
4) COMPONENTS: TK PTB
CAUSE: SEISMICITY (SE)




































































































JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 24

























































JOB TITLE: HADES - COMPUTER CODE FOR EXTERNAL COMMON INITIATING EVENTS ANALYSIS PAGE 25
JOB DESCRIPTION: SAMPLE PROBLEM: SEISMIC EVENT - WAREHOUSE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (FPS) HADES - VERSION 1 MARCH 1982
SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY
COMMON INITIATOR: SEISMICITY (SE)




















































********************************THIS CONCLUDES THE OUTPUT FROM HADES*********************************
APPENDIX F: Published Papers and Interim
Meeting Notes
F.1 Portchester Paper
APPLICATION AND EXTENSION OF THE
MOCUS-BACFIRE2 COMMON CAUSE ANALYSIS
CODE TO REACTOR SAFETY SYSTEMS
C. H. Mak, C. D. Heising
Nuclear Engineering Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, U.S.A.
M. Modarres
Science Applications, Inc.
Bethesda, Maryland 20014, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
A computer code MOCUS-BACFIRE2-BETA (MOBABE2) for quantitative
common cause failure analysis (CCFA) is described in this paper. It
uses the generic cause approach and the beta-factor method to
identify and quantify common cause candidates of a system represented
by a fault tree. The method for computing the reliability of i
redundant safety systems includes both independent apd common cause
failure types. The code is an extension of the qualitative CCFA code
BACFIRE2 by incorporating the beta-factor method. Input to the
programme consists of the system fault tree, common cause
susceptibilities and reliability data parameters. A simplified Fire
Protection System (FPS) is analyzed using the code to demonstrate
the technique for quantitative CCFA. The results indicate common
cause failures are the significant contributors to system
unavailiab ility.
INTRODUCTION
Many methods [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] have been developed for quantitative common
666
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cause failure analysis (CCFA). Most of the techniques available are limited
to common mode failure analysis, i.e. systems consist of similar components
or subsystems that are operated under the same environment. The objective of
the development of the MOBABE2 code is to provide an effective CCFA code for
analysis and evaluation of common cause failures in a complex system
represented by a fault tree.
MOBABE2 is an extension of the qualitative CCFA code BACFIRE2 [6]. The
synthesis procedure developed by Wagner [7] is used to identify common cause
candidates. Then, for each common cause candidate, the total failure
probability is calculated using the beta-factor method 11].
The purpose of this paper is to present a brief description of the theory
and application of the MOBABE2 programme. A detailed description of the
programme can be found in reference 18].
MOBABE2
MOBABE2 has the same structure as BACFIRE2. MOCUS 19], a cut set
generating code, is used to determine the intermediate cut sets of the
dissected fault trees and stores the results in specified logical units. The
Wagner synthesis procedure is used to determine common cause candidates. The
failure probability of each common cause candidate at a common location is
calculated and compared with the cutoff probability (threshold probability).
Common cause candidates are removed from the list if their failure
probabilities are less than the cutoff value. The list of common cause
candidates at a common location were outputted. The same procedures are
carried out for each common location. The programme algorithm is summarized
in Figure 1.
Generic Cause Approach 110]
The generic cause approach is employed to identify common cause
candidates. The qualitative failure characteristics for each component event
in each minimal cut set are examined. In order to be identified as a common
cause candidate, all the basic events of the minimal cut set must have a
common susceptibility located in a common location of that secondary cause.
In some cases, a minimal cut set can be identified as a common cause
candidate based on a common condition, called a common link. A common link
is a dependency among components and cannot be removed by a physical barrier,
e.g. a common energy source or maintenance procedure.
Synthesis Procedure 17]
The procedure used in BACFIRE2 circumvents the problem of determining all
the hardware minimal cut sets from the fault tree by dissecting the fault tree
667
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1111
and determining the minimal cut sets for individual branches and then
synthesizing common cause failure analysis results for the TOP event. The
minimal cut sets found for the individual branches of the dissected fault tree
are called intermediate minimal cut sets. Common cause failure analysis of the
intermediate minimal cut sets yields intermediate common cause candidates for
that particular branch of the fault tree. The dummy event contains all the
information necessary for analysis of the next level of the fault tree. At the
completion of the analysis, the dummy events are expanded and common cause
candidates for the TOP event are constructed.
Definition of the Beta Factor
The beta factor of a component event is the fraction of all common cause
failures to the total number of failures, which include both independent and
common cause failures. Since most components are susceptible to more than one
common cause, the level of susceptibility is used to specify the relative
occurrences of a secondary failure of a component.
Mathematical Model
The common cause candidates identified can be considered as a subsystem.
To quantify the common cause candidates, the tarkov processes is used to model
these subsystems. The failure and repair rates are assumed to be exponentially
distributed. A non-identical repairable two-component system with common cause
failure is used as an example. The Markov state transition diagram is shown in
Figure 2. The following assumptions are made to develop the model:
1) common cause and independent failures are statistically independent,
2) common cause failures can only occur with more than one unit, and
they fail simultaneously.
The system of first order differential equations can be written for the
model as:
2 3
P6(t)=-(1: t)+X (t))P (t)+i 1Pi(t)i ( t )  (1)
?{(t)=-(X2 (t)+l(t))P1 ( t)+P3 (t)x 2 (t)+o(t) (t) (2)
P (t)=-( l ( t ) + p 2 ( t ) )P2(t)+Po(t2(t) 3(t )+P3 (t ) (3)
2 2
P P( t)=-( i 1 i (t)+3 (t) )P 3 (t)+i l (t) (3 -i)(t)+Po (t)c(t) ()
3
i:E P i (t)=l (5)
If all the failure and repair rates are time independent and a set of
appropriate boundary conditions are given, equations (1) to (5) are then a set
of linear differential equations which can be solved by using Laplace transform
techniques. The system unavailability at time t is P (t).
668
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Beta-Factor Method [11, 12]
The total failure rate for each unit,X , is assumed constant with time
and can be expanded into its independent and common cause components:
X = Wi + C (6)
whereX i is the unit failure rate for independent causes, and
X is the unit failure rate for common cause.c
The component parameter beta is defined as the fraction of the total failure
rate attributable to common cause failures:
P = Xc / X (7)
For the same Markov model presented in the previous section, if the
following assumptions are made, then the system model can be simplified as
shown in Figure 3:
1) constant failure rates with time t,
2) consider non-repairable components only, and
3) at time t=0, both units are operable,
i.e. P0 (t=O)-l and Pi(t=O)=O, for i11,2,3.
The system of differential equations for the model are:
P6(t) = -(x1+ 2+Xc)P0(t) (B)
P (t) = -(+ 2+2  )P 1 (t) +X P (t) (9)
P(t) = -( 1l+ s l1  ) P 2 (t)+x2 P (t) (10)
PI(t) = c P(t)+( 2+ )A ) (t)+(+ 1 )P 2(t) (11)
The system unavailability at time t to the second order is:
2 2
F(t) - P3 (t)= ct + 1X2 1+ X 1 2 1 +P 2 )t - ... (12)
2
=Pr(common cause failure) + Pr(random failures) +
Pr(partial common cause failures) + truncation errors
Generalized to a non-identical and non-repairable n-component system:
n n n (n-1)
it) = t+ i=1 itn + .. (13)
Data Parameters for Beta-Factor Method
The major advantage of using the beta-factor method to quantify common
669
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cause candidates is the model parameters are readily available from existing
data bases. Consider an operating time period, T, during which data has been
dollected from each of the N systems where each system consists of two
components of the same type:
N
2"T i=1 1 2Ic
c= 2T !=1 2nic (I )
= 2 Xr n / , (n +n.-+2n ) (16)
=1 ic j=1 11 12 1c
where nil = number of random failure of component 1 in system i,
ni2 = number of random failure of component 2 in system i, and
n. = number of common cause failure.
Estimations of beta factor for different component types obtained from
reliability experience data are found to have values very closely clustered
in the range from 0.1 to 0.2 111ii, 12]. Therefore component types with
unknown betas can be easily approximated. For minimal cut sets with more than
two units, the beta factor model assumes that all units fail if a common
cause failure occurs. The method is most useful for analyzing common cause
failures in systems with limited redundancy, two or three units. The value
cs
for a minimal cut set with different components cannot be estimated from
data directly due to the large number of different combinations of component
types. However cross-component dependencies can generally be neglected.
When individual failure probabilities of each cut set are calculated,
the system failure probability (unavailability) can be calculated as a
function of the failure probabilities of different cut sets, Ci:
F(S) = :Pr(C ) - Pr(C nC ) + ... + (-1)m-1Pr( C2 ... C) (17)i i~j i   1 2  m
APPLICATION
The MOBABE2 code was used to perform a CCFA on a simplified version of
the Fire Protection System of Millstone 1 BWR. The sample problem flow diagram
is in Figure 4; Figure 5 contains the system fault tree. The fault tree
consists of 14 gates and 23 component events; 5 maps were used; a maximm size
of 3 is specified for the cut sets; a cutoff probability was set at 10 and
mission time was ten hours. 344 common cause candidates were identified, of
which 2 cut sets had 1 component and 4 cut sets had 2 components and the rest
were 3-component cut sets. The system unavailability was estimated to be 10.
670
CONCLUSIONS
The code can carry out meaningful quantitative common cause failure
analysis (CCFA) even with limited data available. Experience with the code
is limited to standby reactor safety systems. As data available for CCFA
improves both qualitatively and quantitatively, more sophisticated methods
can be used for common cause failure analysis.
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F.2 Interim Meeting Notes
F.2.1 Progress Review Meeting, March 3, 1982
PROFESSOR CAROLYN D. HEISING
NUCLEAR ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY February 23, 1982
Dear Project Sponsor:
On March 3, 1982 we will be reviewing the status of the common cause analysis
project at M.I.T. Attached is a progress report that details the progress of this
project. We are far along in the accomplishement of the five tasks orginally de-
fined in our proposal. We believe the new code we have developed (MOBABE) will be
a useful tool for utilities involved in system reliability calculations. We hope
to discuss with you how to make our work more amenable for use in probabilistic
risk assessments (PRAs) as well.
Publications sponsored on this project to date include:
(1) Mak, C., 'Assessment and Comparison of Qualitative Common Cause Failure
Analysis Codes", S.M. Thesis, Nuclear Engineering Department, M.I.T..,
August, 1981.
(2) Heising, C.D., Karimi, R., Mak, C., Modarres, M., Rasmussen, N.C., and
Wolf, L., User's Manual for MOCUS-BACFIRE: A omputer Program for Common
Cause Failure Analysis, MIT-EL-81-037, Electric Utility Program, November,
1981.
(3) Mak, C., Heising, 6., and Modarres, M., "Application and Extension of the
MOCUS-BACFIRE Common Cause Analysis Code to Reactor Safety Systems", Ses-
sion IV-B, Common Mode Failures, International ANS/ENS Topical Meeting
on Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Port Chester, New York, September 20-24,
1981.
Publications in progress include:
(1) -ak, C., "Improved Methods for Common Cause Analysis", Engineer's Thesis,
Nuclear Engineering Department, M.I.T.,expected June 1982.
(2) MOBABE User's Manual, expected June 1982 (represents update of User's
M'anual listed above)




Additionally, we are using the MOBABE code for sample problem applications
in tne M.I.T. course 22.40: "Advanced Reliability Analysis and Risk Assessment".














TO: Mr. Raymond Bagley, Northeast Utilities Service Co.
Mr. Robert Krauss, PSE&G Research-Corp.
FROM: Barbara Duffney, Administrative Assistant, Electric Utility
Program /
SUBJECT: Progress Report for the Project: "Common Cause Analysis:
A Review and Extension of Existing Methods"
Enclosed please find the subject report. This report will be discussed
during the progress review meeting scheduled for Wednesday, March 3, 1982
(Ref. my memo to you dated January 28, 1982).
If you have any questions about the report or the meeting, please don't
hesitate to call me at the number listed above.
We look forward to seeing you on March 3.
Enclosure
xc: Prof. C.. Heising
Dr. W. Hinkle
Prof. N. Rasmussen
--L~- -I -)L~'II--~~- ULO ~--  - I-LII~IIIII~L~^
Energy Laboratory











Mr. Raymond Bagley, Northeast Utilities Service Co.
Dr. Jerald Holm, Northeast Utilities Service.Co.
Mr. Robert Krauss, PSE&G Research Corp.
Barbara Duffney, Administrative Assistant, Electric-Utility
Program
Progress Review Meeting for the Project: "Common Cause
Analysis: A Review and Extension of Existing Methods"
confirms our telephone conversations regarding the subject
The meeting will be at MIT on Wednesday, March 3, 1982 in Room E40-464
beginning at 12:00 p.m. with lunch at the Faculty Club (E52-6th floor).
The meeting will end at approximately 4:00 p.m.
Enclosed please find a map of the campus which shows the location of
the meeting room, parking accomodations, and the Faculty Club. The
progress report for this meeting will be mailed to you by or before
February 22, 1982. If you have any questions concerning the meeting,
please don't hesitate to call me at the number listed above.
Enclosure
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Richard C. Tardiff
The First Progress Report
We've had the job a month now
And think that you will find
We have a lot of reasons
To be a month behind.
When you gave us the contract
You multiplied our cares;
We had to stick it in with
Two other big nightmares.
This should be no deterrent
The progress will be fine
When everyone stops laughing
They'll start on the design.
The man who did the runout
Erred and was moved up higher
Our forecasts now look better
'Cause we have a bigger liar.
IEEE Reliability Society
Newsletter, September 1981.
COMMON CAUSE ANALYSIS: A REVIEW AND EXTENSION OF EXISTING METHODS
Carolyn D. Heising, Principal Investigator
Cho Mak, Research Assistant
I. Introduction
The objective of this study is to evaluate and assess existing common
cause failure analysis methods, and to develop a computer program for analy-
sis and evaluation of common cause failures of a system represented by a
fault tree.
The project (1) is structured into five tasks as summarized below (see
Figure 1 ; current status is shown):
TASK 1: Assessment of existing qualitative common cause failure analysis
codes that use the generic cause approach to identify common cause candidates
from minimal cut sets.
TASK 2: Choose an appropriate quantitative method to quantify the common
cause candidates and evaluate the system unavailability.
TASK 3: Implementation of the computer code using the methodology deve-
loped above and use the simplified sample problem to verify that the code
is operational.
TASK 4: Review and further extend the capabilities of the code to include
uncertainty analysis, data collection and interpretation; re-define parameters
and failure criteria.













































Figure 1: Summary of the Project (1).
II. Review of Tasks 1-3 (February 1981 - August 1981)
2.1 The Qualitative CCFA Technique: Generic Cause Approach
The minimal cut sets of the fault tree were identified and the qual-
itative failure characteristics for each basic event in each minimal
cut set were examined. If all of the basic events of the minimal cut set
are susceptible to a secondary cause and are located in a common location,
or if all of the basic events have a common link, the minimal cut set is
then identified as a common cause candidate.
For most complex systems, determining all of the minimal cut sets is
often a difficult if not impossible task. (These will be reviewed in our
March 3 presentation) Two methods have been developed by researchers to
circumvent these difficulties.
2.2 COMCAN 2:EG&G (3): The code uses the susceptibility tree technique to
construct a susceptibility tree for each common location. The susceptibili-
ty trees only contain basic events that are located at that particular
domain and are susceptible to that cause. The minimal cut-sets determined
for each susceptibility tree are the common cause candidates for that common
location . Since the size of the susceptibility tree is generally much small-
er than the original fault tree, this makes determination of minimal cut sets
of any order much faster.
The code had been extended to COMCAN 3 (5) where a useful parameter was
defined. The component importance is the ratio of the sum of unavailabilities
of all common cause candidates that include this component to the total
system unavailability. Components which are major contributors to
system unavailability can be easily identified. Unfortunately, the code
is written for a CDC computer and can only handle qualitative CCFA. Only
independent failures are considered in calculating the unavailabilities
of the minimal cut sets and the system unavailability. These numbers are
inconsistent with the CCFA and may be nonconservative. (6)
2.3 BACFIRE 2
Fussell (4): The synthesis method is used to avoid the need to de-
termine all minimal cut sets. The fault tree is dissected into branches and
dummy events are assigned as top events for the sub-trees. Intermediate
minimal cut sets are determined and intermediate common cause candidates are
identified. The common cause candidates are then constructed by resolving
the dummy events. (8)
2.4 MOBABE MIT (9): A cut-set generating code (MOCUS) has been added to BACFIRE2
and the Beta-Factor method is incorporated to quantify the common cause can-
didates identified. The Beta-Factor method is a parametric model for inter-
component dependencies developed by Karl Fleming (10). Each basic event
failure is assumed exponentially distributed and has total failure rate X
constant with time:
X = i  + (1 )
where
i. = failure rate for independent causes, and1
X = failure rate for common causes.
c
The component parameter 8 is defined as
e = )c /A (2)
The Beta Factor method was chosen to quantify common cause candidates
because parameters necessary for the analysis are readily available from the
literature. Beta factors for different component types are found to have
values between 0.1 to 0.2. Usually, a default value of 0.1 is assigned to
component beta factors which are unknown.
A simplified AFWS and FSP have been used as sample problems, as described in
Cho Mak's S.M. thesis.
III. Review of Task 4 (in progress)
The MOBABE code has been under constant improvement and development since
last fall. Several features have been or are being added to extend the
capability of the program.
3.1 Uncertainty Analysis (11)
In interpreting the results of a risk and/or reliability analysis, there
will often be considerable uncertainty associated with the estimation of the
overall system unavailability. The sources of this uncertainty can arise
from modelling uncertainties and/or data uncertainties. There are several
methods to estimate the propagation of uncertainties (as discussed by
Mazundar(12) ). Only the Monte Carlo method is applicable in our case because
the distribution of the input variables are known. Other analytic techniques
(e.g., linearization, method of moments and numerical integration) require
a prior knowledge of the top event distribution. Moreover, no analytic
technique can handle partially correlated input/coupled event,/dependent events
(i.e., common cause failures). Vicki Bier of M.I.T. (13) put an upper bound
on the uncertainty by assuming that all coupled failures are totally corre-
lated events, and then use the method of moments for propagation of uncer-
tainties in the fault tree. However, this approach is not readily applica-
ble to MOBABE.
The major drawback of the Monte Carlo simulation is the large number of
sinulations necessary for rare events. A Monte Carlo method has been imple-
mented in MOBABE and sample problems have been run using the uncertainty
analysis capability of the code.
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3.2 Continuous or Discrete Distributed Functions
In order to handle common cause initiators which are external events
Oarthquake etc.) the fragility function of the components is necessary for
the analysis. The Beta Factor method may no longer be a pointwise estimate
but a probability distribution function which is a function of both the
fragility curve and the frequency-intensity curve of the common cause.
This type of analysis can be simplified by using discrete probability
distribution analysis. We are continuing to examine the development of a
separate algorithm which can generate Beta factors to be input into the
MOBABE code. It may well be that Beta functions need be specified.
3.3 Data Collection and Interpretation
Data collection and interpretation is a very crucial part of any common
cause analysis. With our limitations of time and resources, direct data
collection and interpretation from raw data sources has not been possible.
Therefore, extreme care must be taken to ensure that data from the available
literature is compatible with our model; subjective judgement must be given
sparse data and the' associated large uncertainties.
Iv. TASK 5: (to be completed by the end of June 1982)
To gain experience and insight on both the limitations and flexibility
of the MOBABE code, a realistic reliability analysis of a safety system with
the cooperation of the utilities will be conducted. We ask for your sugges-
tions of a suitable system to analyze.
V. Conclusions/Recommendations for Further Work
It has to be emphasized that the methodology developed here in the MOBABE
code suitable for certain types of dependent failure analysis and r ek- sss-
ments (e.g., common cause initiators, intersystem physical interactions, etc.).
A more detailed discussion on CCF by Karl Fleming can be found in Ref (14).
Within the overall framework 4f PRA development, however, techniques for other
types of dependent failure analysis are urgently needed (e.g. sneak circuit
analysis, especially in the areas of large system interactions, and human
interactions, etc). We suggest that some of our remaining effort be shifted
to these areas as we near the completion of this project. Moreover, this is
an area we expect will require further work and we expect to propose to
you a project in the area of common cause analysis techniques for power
plant PRAs.
__I___U~~__ ---- s~ ~_~----- -- ~~-Lllii-_.
Leferences
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REVIEW OF PROJECT TASKS
ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING QUALITATIVE COMMON
CAUSE FAILURE ANALYSIS CODES THAT USE
GENERIC CAUSE APPROACH TO IDENTIFY COMMON





CONCLUSION: BACFIRE IS PREFERABLE OVER THE OTHERS, AND
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TASK 2:
STATUS
CHOOSE AN APPROPRIATE QUANTITATIVE METHOD
TO QUANTIFY THE COMMON CAUSE CANDIDATES AND
EVALUATE THE SYSTEM UNAVAILABILTY
COMPLETED MAY 1981
CONCLUSIONS: BETA-FACTOR METHOD DEVELOPED BY KARL FLEMING
AT GENERAL ATOMIC FOR HTGR-PRA IS PREFERABLE.
THIS METHOD WAS INTEGRATED INTO THE MODIFIED
BACFIRE PACKAGE. (IT HAS ALSO BEEN REFINED AND
UPDATED).
PRODUJCT.: MOBABE CODE
(IQcus - .CFIRE - BETA FACTOR METHOD)
i I
TASK 3: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE QUALITATIVE METHOD
CHOSEN TO QUANTIFY COMMON CAUSE CANDIDATES
AND EVALUATE SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY
STATUS: COMPLETED AUGUST 1981
CONCLUSIONS: SAMPLE PROBLEMS WERE RUN USING THE MOBABE
CODE, THESE INCLUDED ANALYSES OF THE FOLLOWING
TWO SYSTEMS:
OAUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFWS)
OFIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (FPS)
DOCUMENTATION:
0CHO MAKIS SM THESIS
PAPER FOR PORTCHESTER PRA MEETING
PRODUCT: USEFUL EXAMPLES TO GUIDE UTILTY EFFORTS
IN SYSTEMS ANALYSIS.
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TASK 4: REVIEW AND FURTHER EXTEND THE CAPABILITIES
OF THE CODE TO INCLUDE UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS,
DATA COLLECTION AND INTERPRETATION; RE-DEFINE
PARAMETERS AND FAILURE CRITERION,
ITATUS: IN PROGRESS FEBRUARY 1982
PROJECTED DATE
OF COMPLETION
END OF MARCH 1932
PRELIMINARY
CONCLUSIONS: MONTE CARLO METHOD APPLICABLE
OHAS BEEN INCORPORATED INTO MOBABE
SAMPLE PROBLEMS ARE BEING RUN
FURTHER WORK NEEDED (BEYOND THIS PROJECT SCOPE):
°MORE EFFICIENT METHOD REQUIRED TO REDUCE COMP, TIME
TASK $: USE OF FINAL VERSION OF THE CODE FOR A




END OF JUNE, 1982
SSUGGESTIONS NEEDED FOR SYSTEM TO BE ANALYZED -41
FINAL PRODUCT:
DOCUMENTATION:
REVISED CODE ON TAPE FOR USE IN
IBM-370 SYSTEM
UPDATED FINAL CODE USER'S MANUAL
CHO MAK'S ENGINEER'S THESIS
TECHNICAL PAPER TO BE SUBMITTED
TO RELIABILITY ENGINEERING JOURNAL
~lsP-""L IC- IYli-iCIILi*l~-CL1-~rr~--rr
-M,I,T, COMMON CAUSE ANALYSIS
APLI ATIIOILOKESTUDY RESULTS TO




APP IC TION F
PROJECT-
1982
BENEFITS OF PRESENT WORK:
EMPHASIS HAS BEEN ON CODE DEVELOPMENT PRIMARILY FOR
UTILITY SYSTEMS RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
OADVANTAGES:
CODE PROVIDES SYSTEMATIC FRAMEWORK FOR PERFORMING
A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SYSTEM AVAILABILITY (POINT
ESTIMATE PLUS UNCERTAINTY BOUNDS)
0DISADVANTAGES:
USE OF SUCH DETAILED INFORMATION IN A PRA MAY NOT
BE NECESSARY,
A SIMPLIFIED APPROACH TO CCFA MAY BE MORE DESIRABLE
IN A FULL-SCALL UTILITY PRA FOR REASONS OF REDUCED
COST AND ENHANCED USE OF THE AVAILABLE DATA
__~LIIL;II-.i ~II..-.~~CI-LIII-. --.-- i-ll-l~ X-i~l~*-^ l I~LIY ~UIIIIPIUI-~~
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK:
FOCUS ON UTILITY PLANT-SPECIFIC PRA' S
METHODS FOR CCFA WILL BE BROADER AND MORE SIMPLIFIED
PROPOSED METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
CAUSE-TABLE APPROACH --(CAUSE TABLE - DPD)
oTHIS
USED
IS THE SIMPLIFIED FAULT TREE ANALYSIS METHOD
IN THE Z/IP STUDIES
OBENEFIT TO UTILITY IS REDUCED COST AND MORE MANAGEABLE
FAULT TREES
CAUSE TABLE REQUIRES FULL DETAILED UNDERSTANDING OF
SYSTEM, MUST INCORPORATE EXPERT JUDGEMENT INTO NUMERICAL
EVALUATIONS
TABLE 3-1. EXAMPLE CAUSE TABLE FOR CAUSES AFFECTING SINGLE AND MULTIPLE COMPO':E6TS
SYSTEM: Sample
COMPONENTS: A, B, C, D, E, F, G
MINIMAL CUTSETS: A, D, BC, EFG
Part I - Accident Sequence Dependent Boundary Conditions
Changes inInterfacing Systems Changes in
Initiating Accident Interfacing Systems Internal and
Event Sequence Failures and Boundary External
Environment
Part II - Single Failure Cause Sets
Components
Cause Category







Part III - Multiple Failure Cause Sets
Component Failure Sets
Cause Category
















/TABLE 3-2. DEPENDENT FAILURES ASSOCIATED WITH
A CAUSE TABLE TYPE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
I. Accident Sequence Dependent Boundary Conditions
A. Failures of Interfacing/Support Systems (shared equipment
dependencies in Table 1-2)
B. Sequence Dependent Environmental Changes
C. Sequence Dependent Exceedance of System Operating Limits
D. Other






B. Physical Interactions (excessive environmental stresses)
C. Other
III. Multiple Failures Resulting from Different but Dependent Causes
A. Propagating Failures
D. Technical Specification Dependencies
C. Other
°DPD METHOD FOR EXTERNAL EVENT ANALYSIS:
oREFINE DPD METHOD USED FOR EXTERNAL EVENT ANALYSIS
TO EXTEND TO OTHER TYPES OF COMMON CAUSE EVENTS
(E,GI; HUMAN ERROR, ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS: CORROSION,
DEGRADATION, ETC.)
ADVANTAGE OF METHOD:
OSIMPLE AND LESS EXPENSIVE TO USE IN FULL-SCALE PRAS
°CAN BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH MORE DETAILED CCA
COMPUTER CODES (SUCH AS MOBABE) WHEN FURTHER DETAIL
IS REQUIRED IN THE PRA
oPROVIDES UTILITY ANALYST WITH SYSTEMATIC WAY TO IN-
CORPORATE EXPERT OPINION AND BETTER WAY TO VALIDATE
RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS
THE CAUSE TABLE APPROACH HAS BEEN EXTENSIVELY APPLIED AND
THEREFORE REPRESENTS A BONAFIDE METHOD WHICH CAN BE
EXTENDED FOR CCFA
SUGGESTED SCHEDULE FOR NEW PROJECT PROPOSAL:
"CCFA METHODS FOR LARGE-SCALE UTILITY PRAS"
(1) WRITE PRE-PROPOSAL OUTLINING IN GREATER DETAIL THE
STUDY METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH (CAUSE TABLE & DPD)
(2) SUBMIT BY APRIL 1, 1932 FOR REVIEW BY UTILITY SPON-
SORS WITH PROJECTED DATE OF START-UP OF PROJECT
AUGUST-SEPTEMBER, 1932,
(3) EXPECTED LEVEL OF SUPPORT REQUIRED: APPROXIMATELY
60K FOR 1 YEAR
(4) EXPECTED TIME FRAME: 1 YEAR (COMPLETED BY SEPTEMiBER
1983)
(b) PROJECT STRUCTURE: MAINTAIN CURRENT STRUCTURE, FIND
NEW STUDENT TO PURSUE WORK, PROBABLY AT SM LEVEL,
SUGGESTED SCHEDULE FOR NEW PROJECT PROPOSAL:
"CCFA METHODS FOR LARGE-SCALE UTILITY PRAS"
(1) WRITE PRE-PROPOSAL OUTLINING IN GREATER DETAIL THE
STUDY METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH (CAUSE TABLE & DPD)
(2) SUBMIT BY APRIL 1, 1932 FOR REVIEW BY UTILITY SPON-
SORS WITH PROJECTED DATE OF START-UP OF PROJECT
AUGUST-SEPTEMBER, 1932,
(3) EXPECTED LEVEL OF SUPPORT REQUIRED: APPROXIMATELY
60K FOR 1 YEAR
(4) EXPECTED TIME FRAME: 1 YEAR (COMPLETED BY SEPTEMBER
1983)
() PROJECT STRUCTURE: MAINTAIN CURRENT STRUCTURE, FIND
NEW STUDENT TO PURSUE WORK, PROBABLY AT SM LEVEL,
SU ~ESTED SCHEDULE FOR NEW PROJECT PROPOSAL:
"CCFA METHODS FOR LARGE-SCALE UTILITY PRAS"
(1) WRITE PRE-PROPOSAL OUTLINING IN GREATER DETAIL THE
STUDY METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH (CAUSE TABLE & DPD)
(2) SUBMIT BY APRIL 1, 1932 FOR REVIEW BY UTILITY SPON-
SORS WITH PROJECTED DATE OF START-UP OF PROJECT
AUGUST-SEPTEMBER, 1932,
(3) EXPECTED LEVEL OF SUPPORT REQUIRED: APPROXIMATELY
60K FOR 1 YEAR
( ) EXPECTED TIME FRAME: 1 YEAR (COMPLETED BY SEPTE' BER
( ) ROJECT STRUCTURE: MAINTAIN CURRENT STRUCTURE, FIND
;'SEW STUDENT TO PURSUE WORK. PROBABLY AT SM LEVEL,
F.2.2 Progress Review Meeting, August 30, 1982
PROFESSOR CAROLYN D. HEISING
NUCLEAR ENGiNEERING DEPARTMENT
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
August 30, 1982
Dear Project Sponsor:
Today, we are reviewing the final work accomplished in the research pro-
ject "Common Cause Analysis: A Review and Extension of Existing Methods".
The major output of this project, which has involved a one-year funded re-
search effort (10/l/81--9/30/82), has been the development of new computer
code that can evaluate system fault trees quantitatively for common cause
failures. The code, entitled MOBB for Mocus Bacfire Beta factor, has com-
bined the generic cause approach of Fussel in the Bacfire-II package for the
qualitative identification of common cause cutset candidates, with the Beta-
Factor methods of Fleming and Raabe for their quantification. This code has
also been developed with an uncertainty analysis propagation package based on
two methods: (1) Monte Carlo simulation, and (2) heuristic analytic approach
(Bier). The code has been applied to assess the ADS system at the Millstone
nuclear power station, as well as to other example problems.
We plan to cover the work accomplished by myself and Mr. Cho Mak, who
has recently completed his Engineer's thesis as a result of this project.
A technical paper will be written and submitted to the journal Reliability
Engineering by October 30, 1982. A user's manuel for the code has also been
produced. This manual replaces that reported on in reference (2) below.
(1) Mak, C., "Assessment and Comparison of Qualitative Common Cause Failure
Analysis Codes", S.M. Thesis, Nuclear Engineering Department, M.I.T.,
August, 1981.
(2) Heising, C.D., Karimi, R., Mak, C., Modarres, M., Rasmussen, N.C., and
Wolf, L., User's Manual for MOCUS-BACFIRE: A Computer Program for Common
Cause Failure Analysis, MIT-EL-81-037, Electric Utility Program, November
1981.
(3) Mak, C., Heising, C., and Modarres, M., "Application.and Extension of the
MOCUS-BACFIRE Common Cause Analysis Code to Reactor Safety Systems", Ses.
sion IV-B, Common Mode Failures, International ANS/ENS Topical Meeting on




We will be mailing to you in the next two weeks the completed Engineer's
thesis and the user's manual. We will also send to you copies of the technical
paper when completed.
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ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING QUALITATIVE COMMON
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CHOOSE AN APPROPRIATE QUANTITATIVE METHOD
TO QUANTIFY THE COMMON CAUSE CANDIDATES AND
EVALUATE THE SYSTEM UNAVAILABILTY
COMPLETED MAY 1981
CONCLUSIONS: BETA-FACTOR METHOD DEVELOPED BY KARL FLEMING
AT GENERAL ATOMIC FOR HTGR-PRA IS PREFERABLE,
THIS METHOD WAS INTEGRATED INTO THE MODIFIED
BACFIRE PACKAGE. (IT HAS ALSO BEEN REFINED AND
UPDATED),
PRODUCT: MOBABE CODE






IMPLEMENTATION OF THE QUALITATIVE METHOD
CHOSEN TO QUANTIFY COMMON CAUSE CANDIDATES
AND EVALUATE SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY
COMPLETED AUGUST 1981
SAMPLE PROBLEMS WERE RUN USING THE MOBABE
CODE. THESE INCLUDED ANALYSES OF THE FOLLOWING
TWO SYSTEMS:
°AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFWS)
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (FPS)
DOCUMENTATION:
0CHO MAK'S SM THESIS
=PAPER FOR PORTCHESTER PRA MEETING
PRODUCT: USEFUL EXAMPLES TO GUIDE UTILTY EFFORTS
IN SYSTEMS ANALYSIS.
TASK 4: REVIEW AND FURTHER EXTEND THE CAPABILITIES
OF THE CODE TO INCLUDE UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS,
DATA COLLECTION AND INTERPRETATION; RE-DEFINE
PARAMETERS AND FAILURE CRITERION.
STATUS: CoAMPLE-~ .
PRELIMINARY
CONCLUSIONS: oMONTE CARLO METHOD APPLICABLE
HAS BEEN INCORPORATED INTO MOBS
SAMPLE PROBLEMS pUN
FURTHER WORK NEEDED (BEYOND THIS PROJECT SCOPE):
MORE EFFICIENT METHOD REQUIRED TO REDUCE COMP. TIME
USE OF FINAL VERSION OF THE CODE FOR A










CODE ON TAPE FOR USE IN
SYSTEM
FINAL CODE USER'S MANUAL
CHO MAK'S ENGINEER'S THESIS
TECHNICAL PAPER TO BE SUBMITTED
TO RELIABILITY ENGINEERING JOURNAL
COMMON CAUSE ANALYSIS PROJECT-
APPLICATION OF STUDY RESULTS TO







UP RISK ASS SSMENTS: F TUR P 
-MI T,
BENEFITS OF PRESENT WORK:
SEMPHASIS HAS BEEN ON CODE DEVELOPMENT PRIMARILY FOR
UTILITY SYSTEMS RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
ADVANTAGES:
CODE PROVIDES SYSTEMATIC FRAMEWORK FOR PERFORMING
A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SYSTEM AVAILABILITY (POINT
ESTIMATE PLUS UNCERTAINTY BOUNDS)
DISADVANTAGES:
USE OF SUCH DETAILED INFORMATION IN A PRA MAY NOT
BE NECESSARY.
A SIMPLIFIED APPROACH TO CCFA MAY BE MORE DESIRABLE
IN A FULL-SCALL UTILITY PRA FOR REASONS OF REDUCED
COST AND ENHANCED USE OF THE AVAILABLE DATA
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE WO R K ~
FOCUS ON UTILITY PLANT-SPECIFIC PRAIS
METHODS FOR CCFA WILL BE BROADER AND MORE SIMPLIFIED
PROPOSED METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
CAUSE-TABLE APPROACH -- (CAUSE TABLE - DPD)
THIS IS THE SIMPLIFIED FAULT TREE ANALYSIS METHOD
USED IN THE Z/IP STUDIES
0BENEFIT TO UTILITY IS REDUCED COST AND MORE MANAGEABLE
FAULT TREES
CAUSE TABLE REQUIRES FULL DETAILED UNDERSTANDING OF
SYSTEMj MUST INCORPORATE EXPERT JUDGEMENT INTO NUMERICAL
EVALUATIONS
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTUR WORK: U
*TABLE 3-1. EXAMPLE CAUSE TABLE FOR CAUSES AFFECTING SINGLE AND MULTIPLE COMP0~E NTS
SYSTEM: Sample
COMPONENTS: A, B, C, D, E, F, G
-MINIMAL CUTSETS: A, D, BC, EFG
Part I - Accident Sequence Dependent Boundary Conditions
Interfacing Systems Chtnges ain
.Initiating Accident Failures and BoundaryInternal and
Event Sequence Conditions Envixteronmental
Environment
Part II - Single Failure Cause Sets
Components
Cause Category .. _._ _ _ _ _ _







Part III - Multiple Failure Cause Sets
Component Failure Sets
Cause Category















TABLE 3-2. DEPENDENT FAILURES ASSOCIATED WITH
A CAUSE TABLE TYPE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
I. Accident Sequence Dependent Boundary Conditions
A. Failures of Interfacing/Support Systems (shared equipment
dependencies in Table 1-2)
B. Sequence Dependent Environmental Changes
C. Sequence Dependent Exceedance of System Operating Limits
D. Other






B. Physical Interactions (excessive environmental stresses)
C. Other
III. Multiple Failures Resulting from Different but Dependent Causes
A. Propagating Failures
3. Technical Specification Dependencies
C. Other
!-
DPD METHOD FDR EXTERNAL EVENT ANALYSIS:
REFINE DPD METHOD USED FOR EXTERNAL EVENT ANALYSIS
TO EXTEND TO OTHER TYPES OF COMMON CAUSE EVENTS
(E.G,; HUMAN ERROR, ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS: CORROSION,
DEGRADATION, ETC,)
ADVANTAGE OF METHOD:
SIMPLE AND LESS EXPENSIVE TO USE IN FULL-SCALE PRAS
CAN BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH MORE DETAILED CCFA
COMPUTER CODES (SUCH AS MOBABE).WHEN FURTHER DETAIL
IS REQUIRED IN THE PRA
PROVIDES UTILITY ANALYST WITH SYSTEMATIC WAY TO IN-
CORPORATE EXPERT OPINION AND BETTER WAY TO VALIDATE
RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS
THE CAUSE TABLE APPROACH HAS BEEN EXTENSIVELY APPLIED AND
THEREFORE REPRESENTS A BONAFIDE METHOD WHICH CAN BE
EXTENDED FOR CCFA
Research Proposal
COMMON CAUSE ANALYSIS METHODS FOR
LARGE SCALE UTILITY PRAs
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MONTE CARLO METHOD -
USE SIMULATIONS TO OBTAIN TOP EVENT FAILURE PROBABILITY
DISTRIBUTION BY SPECIFY BASIC EVENTS' DISTRIBUTION.
METHOD OF MOMENTS -
CALCULATE TOP EVENT DISTRIBUTION MOMENTS BY PROPAGATING
UNCERTAINTIES FROM THE BASIC EVENTS LEVEL TO CUT SETS'
LEVEL AND THEN TO SYSTEM LEVEL.
ASSUMPTIONS:
VARIATES ARE LOGNORMALLY DISTRIBUTED1
FAILURE PROBABILITIES -,.01






0 < x <
0<x
mth moment = exp [m + m22a







mth moment = 10 xm Sb(x,P,a) dx
Truncated Log-normal Distribution St







mth moment= 10 xm St(x,P,a) dx
where c is the normalization factor
c=- 1 S1 (x,p,o) dx
The variance of F is the second moment about the mean:
var(F) = E[F 2 ] - (E[F]) 2
n sf 2








cov(Xi,X.)13 + .. (A7)
When fault tree method is used for analyzing system
failure probability the system equation is often expressed in sum of
product form. Two special cases where F .is either the sum or the
product of its component distributions.
Case I





E[F] = r X.
i=1 i
Variance
var(F) = z var(Xi ) +
i=l
n-l n
2 E z cov(X.,X.)















i=l j=i+l Xi Xi j
cov(Xi x )
n
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mth moment = exp[m p + m2a 2
*7






mth moment = 10 x Sb(x, P, a) dx
Truncated Log-normal Distribution St







= 1 xm S (x,v,a) dx
where c is the normalization factor
c= A0 S1(x,,a) dx
0<x








































































Boolean Expression for system unavailability:
S = X1 + X2X3 + XX5 +-X6









Method Mean Variance Mean Variance
Discrete 5.936x10- 3  7.2x10- 6  1.49x10- 2  2.14x10-
Method of
Moments: S1  5.936x10-3  9.4x10- 6  1.491x0 - 2  8.76x0 -4
Sb  5.933x10- 3  9.4x10- 6  1.410x10 - 2  3.97x10
St  5.938x0 - 3  9.4xlO- 6  1.424x10- 2  4.80x10- 4
Monte Carlo
Sample (3000) 5.955x10 3  8.6x10O 1.426x10 2  .3.97x10 4
Sample (1200) 5.996x10-3  9.3x10- 6  1.477x10 - 2  4.73x10 - 4
Discrete 3  - 6  2
(1200) 5.788x1( 6.3x10 1.402x10 1.89x10
00
XO~.vvx



















SUSCEPTIBI LITIES GENERIC CAUSE
& RANKINGS LIST
FAILURE RATES












































AUTO-REMOTE ACTUATION OF APR VALVE
4 pressure switches
4 water level sensors
4 pressure switches
lo-lo vessel LPCI or
Hi drywell water level core spray Interlock
pressure
pump discharge










3A 3C 3D 3F

















2) RELIEF/SAFETY VALVES ACTUATION
TO RELIEF HIGH VESSEL PRESSURE
FULL POWER PRESSURE 1000 PSIG
DESIGN LIMIT 1375 PSIG
SUCCESS: ANY 4 OUT OF 6 APR OR R/S VALVES
- TURBINE TRIP FROM FULL POWER
- A FAILURE OF THE TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM
- A FAILURE OF THE DIRECT REACTOR SCRAM BASED ON
STOP VALVE POSITION




3) MANUAL ACTUATION MODE






HUMAN ERRORS IS THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTOR
WAREHOUSE SAMPLE PROBLEM SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM
BOOLEAN EXPRESSION
F = ST + SP + TA + TB
WHERE TA = PTA + TK + ( EC + OP * DG )
TB = PTB + ( EC + OP * DG )
F = ST + SP + PTA * PTB + EC + OP * DG + TK.* PTB
F : SYSTEM FAILURE DUE TO SEISMIC EVENTS
THE FOLLOWING EVENTS ARE CONDITIONAL TO THE SEISMIC EVENTS:
ST : STRUCTURE ( BUILDING AND SUPPORTING'STRUCTURE FOR
COMPONENTS TO ATTACH ON )
SP : SPRINKLING SYSTEM
TA : PUMP TRAIN A
TB : PUMP TRAIN B.
PTA: PUMP A AND ASSOCIATED VALVES AND PIPING
PTB: PUMP B AND ASSOCIATED VALVES AND PIPING
TK : WATER STORAGE TANK
OP : OFF-SITE POWER SUPPLIES
DG : DIESEL GENERATOR
EC : ELECTRONIC DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEM
COMMON EXTERNAL INITIATING EVENTS
(REF: PRA PROCEDURE GUIDE NUREG/CR-2300, CHAPTER 11)
- DEVELOP HAZARD MODEL FOR THE INITIATING EVENTS
- FREQUENCY OF EXCEEDANCE VS INTENSITY CURVES
- DEVELOP RESPONSE MODEL
- COMPONENTS' OR SUBSYSTEMS' FRAGILITY CURVES
- CONVOLVING THE FREQUENCY WITH THE FRAGILITY FUNCTIONS
- DEVELOP SYSTEM LOGIC MODEL (FAULT TREE - EVENT TREE)
- SYSTEM FAILURE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
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SAMPLE PROBLEM
. METHOD 1: -ESTABLISHED SEISMIC FREQUENCY CURVES
-SPECIFIED COMPONENTS' FRAGILITY FUNCTIONS
-COMPUTE COMPONENTS' FAILURE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
FUNCTIONS (DPD)
-COMPUTE SYSTEM FAILURE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
USING THE DPD METHOD
MEAN = 1,52 x 10-7/YR
VAR = 2,09 x 10- 1 4
MEAN TO STANDARD DEVIATION RATIO = 1,0514
METHOD 2:-SIESMICITY CURVES
-COMPONENTS' FRAGILITY FUNCTIONS
-USE THE METHOD OF MOMENTS TO FIND THE SYSTEM
FRAGILITY FUNCTIONS
-COMPUTE SYSTEM UNAVAILIABILITY DISTRIBUTION
FUNCTION (DPD)
MEAN = Z714 x 10- 8 /YR
VAR = 5.09 x 10-15
MEAN TO STANDARD DEVIATION RATIO = 1,0008
F.3 Original Proposal of July, 1981
rr~iP~rrr~ -- *-- UI~n -/lrlppCrc--au~-~-- -;*ra~ . ~Ylili~-*  -
Research Proposal
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7. * * * * * *
1. Objectives of The Proposal
The main objective of the proposed research is to further
assess and extend the MOCUS-BACFIRE Package Code (1), COMCAN-IXI
code (2)and BACFIRE-II Code (3) to provide the utilities with
an effective and powerful tool for analysis and evaluation of
common cause failures (CCF) in a system represented by its
fault tree diagram. Based on the existing version of these
three codes it is suggested that the research be focused on
the following areas:
(1) Assessment and comparison of MOCUS-BACFIRE, COMCAN-II,
and BACFIRE-II codes,
(2) Redefinition of existing criteria for identifying CCFs
and incorporating them into the selected code..
.(3) Selection and incorporation of a more sophisticated common
cause quantification technique into the selected code.
(4) With close cooperation of the utilities,a problem
of their interest will be evaluated using the improved
version.
A detailed review of each of the above will follow in Section 4.
2. Expected Benefits
The expected benefits for the utilities are to obtain a code
which is:
------- IP----- lllsIPCT*llsYIIIYI Plpp~ __. ~
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(1) capable of identifying common cause failures directly
from the fault tree diagram;
(2) inexpensive and easy to operate;
(3) capable of automatically generating common cause can-
didates which are significantly contributing to the
failure of the system due to common cause failures;
(4) capable of calculating the top event probability (or
unavailability) by considering both random and common
cause failures;
(5) especially suited for man-machine communication and
its advantages.
It should be noted that previous experiences in the field of
common cause failure analysis at MIT (1) have emphasized the
importance of these benefits in a complete system safety and
risk analysis. These features would constitute a capability
for the sponsoring utilities which is otherwise only available
by using several different' codes.
3. Short Review of State-of-the-Art
unavailability calculations of engineering safety features
and risk assessment studies (4,5) revealed the importance of
considering potential common cause failures in estimating the
probability of failure of redundant systems. It is a well-
recognized fact that reliability predictions of redundant systems
are overestimated when-the potential for common cause failures
is not properly accounted for. In fact, the RSS amply demon-
strated that CCF may contribute the most to system unavailability.
The state-of-the-art of CCF analysis up to 1979 has been
reviewed by Rasmussen et al. (6). Hayden (7) separated CCF's
-3-
into component and system failures and categorized them in
terms of generic failure mechanisms such as design error, human
error and energetic events. Apostolakis (8) used a constant
hazard rate for reliability and redefined the hazard rate by
using a point estimate of the conditional probability that a
unit failure is due to a common cause failure.
Certainly the most thorough CCF analysis was performed as
part of the RSS in each of the following analysis steps:
- Event tree construction
- Fault tree construction
- Fault tree quantification
- Event tree quantification
- Special engineering investigations
Computerized efforts in the qualitative and quantitative pro-
cedure of common cause failures were begun with special emphasis
after the publication of the RSS. Burdick et al. (9) reported
on COMCAN Code. This code is designed to aid in the qualitative
determination of:
1) single secondary events that could fail entire minimum
cutset, given all components in the cutset share the
same susceptibility location.
2) Common links among components such as common circuitry,
common maintenance personnel or common manufacturers
for all components in a cutset.
As a result, COMCAN requires as one of its inputs, a set of
minimal cutsets which have been obtained by some other qualit&tive
analysis code. It is quite apparent that for large fault trees
-4-
with a high degree of replications and the possibility.of
several common cause failures, the computational efforts involved
in the minimal cutset sorting become tremendous, if not impos-
sible, due to the large amount of minimal cutsets. Modarres
et al. (1) have developed a computer code package to resolve
this difficulty by coupling the cutset generator code MOCUS (10)
and common cause failure analysis code BACFIRE (11) to obtain
the MOCUS-BACKFIRE Package. The BACFIRE Code is a newer and more
adequate version of the COMCAN Code. However, a newly developed
version of the COMCAN Code, which is called COMCAN-II (2), has
been recently developed to directly evaluate common cause fail-
ures from the fault' tree diagram.' Similarly, BACFIRE is extended
to obtain BACFIRE-II Code (3). Therefore, codes COMCAN-II, BAC-.
FIRE-II and MOCUS-BACFIRE have relatively similar capabilities.
However, they employ different algorithms to determine CCFs, and
the efficiency and limitations of these codes are not compared
and assessed yet. The development of the COMCAN methodology
laid the ground for the first time with basic rules which will
be common to all future efforts involving common cause handling.
The most important thing which was realized during the course
of the development of this code is the recognition of the impor-
tance of generic classification. The possible physical sources
for a specific secondary event can develop into an absolutely end-
less list. Only a unique generic classification makes the search
for minimal cutsets sharing susceptibilities a tractable task.
For this purpose, a preprocess.or has been implemented in COMCAN
which needs as input generic categorization of secondary causes.
-5-
A special category has been added which links conditions among
components to locate potential common cause failures of minimal
cutsets. The other three categories considered by COMCAN are:
- Mechanical or Thermal
- Electrical or Radiation
- Chemical or Miscellaneous
Recent studies (1, 12) have shown that the criteria for
identifying a cutset as a common cause candidate in COMCAN code.
is not unique and sufficient for a complete CCF analysis. It is
important, however, to select an adequate set of CCF criteria
in order to obtain a set of adequate common cause candidates.
The review of computerized qualitative common cause failure
analysis suggests the following conclusions. First, the original
COMCAN code's approach, which uses the complete minimal cutset
information, has no potential for further development because
of a prohibitive amount of cutsets that must be input to the code
for a large fault tree. Second, the codesMOCUS-DACFIRE, COMCAN-II
and BACFIRE-II are the only codes that are recently developed to
eliminate the necessity to input the cutsets. Therefore, instead
of the cutsets, they require the fault tree to be input. However,
they are not fully tested and assessed. A careful revision is
required to establish a set of new criteria for identification
of common cause candidates from the cutsets.
The state-of-the-art in commorr cause quantification is
largely determined by the work described in WASH-1400 and the
new developments by Vesely (13.). Whereas in WASH-1400 common
cause failure probabilities were evaluated using upper and lower
probability bounds, Vesely showed that common cause failure
probabilities can also be evaluated directly by using the
I--i.~iii~~
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multivariate exponential model developed by Marshal and Olkin
(14). For this purpose, Vesely developed a statistical
estimation technique for cases where common cause failures are
repairable. Two special cases were examined, the constant fail-
ure rate case and the binomial failure rate case. A BWg scram
system served as an example. In another paper, Johnson and
Vesely (15) applied the same technique to the common cause analy-
sis of valve leakages. In both papers, actual data were used
from EPRI records and Licensee Event Reports(LER), respectively.
It should be noticed that the quantification model used is
dependent upon the data populations and presupposes that the
components from a given defined population are subject to simi-
lar failure causes.
Fleming and Raabe (16) compared GA's approach (14) (known
as 8-method) to both aforementioned methods (i.e., RSS and
Vesely's methods). The objective of their paper was to show
the validity of the common cause coupling 8-method as compared
to the bounding technique of the RSS and the multivariate
exponential distribution of Vesely. Modarres et al. (1) has
recently studied a method to quantify CCF affect by using a
Markovian approach. They used exponential distributions to
model and evaluate the failure probability of cutsets due to
both random cause and common cause failures. A simplified aux-
feed system served as an example, and failure probabilities
were close to that predicted by the RSS bounding method.
4. Suggested Work Statement
As discussed in Section 1.0, the main objective of the work
proposed here is to develop an efficient tool
-7-
with which to characterize common cause failures for reactor
safety systems. It is suggested that the proposed work be
structured into the following tasks:
Task 1. Acquisition and Implementation of the COMCAN-II
and BACFIRE-II Codes
COMCAN-II (2) and its predecessor, COMCAN, are programs
for (a) locating common cause candidates and (b) identifying
the associated significant common cause events. COMCAN uses
fault tree minimal cutsets as inputs for analysis. However,
for large fault trees, time and monetary considerations usually
require that codes designed for obtaining fault tree minimal
cutsets have their outputs restricted to minimal cutsets con-
taining small numbers of events--usually three events or less.
Because any number of events might exist simultaneously due to
the same secondary cause, an analysis considering only small
order minimal cutsets can omit significant dependencies.
BACFIRE-II is the predecessor of the BACFIRE Code. It uses
a new methodology suggested by Wagner (17). In this methodology
cutsets of intermediate gates that are not common cause candi-
dates are removed and the gate is replaced by a dummy event.
COMCAN-II, BACFIRE-II, and MOCUS-BACFIRE are designed to
circumvent COMCAN's limitation of dependence upon the minimal
cutsets obtained by other codes. COMCAN-II utilizes the new
fault tree cutset generator code FATRAM (18) as a program module,
and MOCUS-BACFIRE uses the MOCUS code as its cutset generator.
All of these three codes use the generic classification of
secondary causes that was developed for the COMCAN Code. Generic
~gai -~i~~unrr~rms~~_.*lb_
classification of secondary causes results in a finite number
of events to be considered. For example, it suffices to
search for minimal cutsets susceptible to the generic secondary
cause "impact" rather than for those susceptible to "source"
of impact such as pipe whip, missile, or earthquake. The gen-
eric classification thus bounds the analysis and makes it tract-
able.
COMCAN-II is written in FORTRAN for CDC CYBER-76 computers
and therefore should be run on a CDC machine if possible.* Task
1 would therefore be to obtain the COMCAN-II and BACFIRE-II codes
and make them operational. The code MOCUS-BACFIRE is already
operating on MIT's IBM 370/168 computer.
Task 2. Assessment and Comparison of MOCUS-BACFIRE, COMCAN-
II, and BACFIRE-II Codes
The purpose of this task is to identify the most efficient
code for further development. The Code MOCUS-BACFIRE has
already been tested and examined for a number of examples (1, 15).
Various examples will serve to accomplish this comparison.
For a final decision on which code will be taken for further
development by using sample examples, one should consider the
following factors
- Convenience with regard to inputting data and reading
the output.
- Restriction on the size of the input fault tree.
- Restriction on fault tree logic structure.
- Possibility of changes in different routines of these
codes.
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- Computation time on the respective computers for a
given example (i.e., CPU time)
Finally, based on the findings from this comparison and
through close cooperation and consultation with the sponsoring
utilities, the most promising code will be selected.
Task 3: Redefinition of Existing Criteria for Identifying
CCF Modes and Incorporating Them into The Selected Code De-
scribed in Task (2)
The criteria used in COMCAN-II, BACFIRE-II and MOCUS-BACFIRE
for identifying a cutset as a CCF are similar. They are as
follows:
(I) A cutset is a common cause candidate if all the basic
events in that cutset are associated by a condition
which alone may increase the possibility of multiple
component malfunction. An example of a common cause
special condition would be all components implied by
the basic events of a minimal cutset having been installed
by the same construction crew, or all sharing a common
power supply or manufacturer.
(2) A cutset is a common cause candidate if all the basic
events in that cutset are susceptible to the same second-
ary failure cause and are located in the same domain
for that cause of secondary failure. For example, if
all the components implied by the basic events in a
minimal cutset fail when exposed to excessive heat and
no barrier to heat exists between the components, the
cutset is identified as a common, cause candidate.
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Recent studies (1, 12, 19) have shown that in some cases
important dependencies in the cutsets or sequences of failures
may be ignored by using above criteria. For example, for the
case of a complete loss of a.c. power one needs both diesel gen-
erators. and off-site power to fail. That is
D.G.,11 D.G. 2, L.O.P.
However, a great number of dependencies exist between the two
diesel generators, but not between loss of offsite power and
the two diesel generators. The following dependencies can
exist between the two diesel generators:
- Common maintenance crew
- Common manufacturer
- Common heat barrier
- Common mechanical vibration barriers, etc.
However, by using the aforementioned criteria, the loss of
complete a.c. power sequence will not be identified as a common
cause candidate due to only partial dependencies and not com-
plete dependency among sequences of events. This would result
in a major miscalculation in probabilities of complete blackout.
The random failure of each diesel generator is estimated to be
1/58 per demand (16). The frequency of the loss-of-offsite
power is estimated to be 0.2/year. Therefore, the total loss
of a.c. power dueto random failures would be approximately
5.8 x 10-5/year. By taking into account the effect of depen-
dencies between the two diesel generators one finds the failure
probability of the two units, using the 8-factor method, to be
2 x 10-3/demand (16). Therefore, the total loss of a.c. power dem nd 16). her  ettlls c e
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probability would be (2 x 10- 3 ) x (0.2) = 4.0 x 10-4/year.
It is obvious that by ignoring the dependency between the two
diesel generators the a.c. system failure probability would
be underestimated by a factor of about 10.
To identify any dependency it is suggested that the following
criteria be used:
(1) A cutset is a common cause candidate if any two or
more of the basic events in that cutset are associated
with conditions which alone may increase the probabili-
ty of multiple malfunction.
(2) A cutset is a common cause candidate if any two or more
of the basic events in that cutset are susceptible
to the same secoidary failure cause and are located
in the same domain for that cause of secondary failure.
The number of minimal cutsets that are identified as common
cause candidates using above criteria would result in an increase
in the number of common cause candidates compared to the old
criteria, because any dependency among components of the cutsets
would be identified. It is important, however, to eliminate
those cutsets whose contribution to the total system failure is
.negligible. For this reason one might use a probability CUTOFF
value to eliminate any cutset having an unavailability of less
than this value. For example, if ABCDE is a common cause can-
didate because. of dependency between A and B, but random failure
probability of C x*D x E is less than the CUTOFF value, then
ABCDE may be eliminated.
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Task 4: Selection and Incorporation of a Potential
Common Cause Failure Quantification Technique
Common cause failure quantification techniques are dis-
cussed in detail in reference (6). The most promisingtechniques
are Vessely's Marshal-Olkin specialization (13),. -Factor (16),
and RSS bounding (4) technique. Marshal-Olkin specialization
technique is capable of estimating CCF rates from scarce data.
The method is very complex and is mainly applicable to scarce
data.
The B-Factor method allows proper probabilistic treatment
of CCF by separating the depency contribution among components
of the system. Data can be synthesized when directly applicable.*
data are scarce. However, the method is limited by existing
data to only redundant systems.
The RSS bounding technique has been applied and presented
for most of the reactor safety systems in the WASH-1400 study.
The accuracy of this system is questionable for some special
cases (20). A recent study (16) has compared the 8-Factor
method with the RSS bounding and Marshal-Olkin specialization
techniques. It is shown in this study that the B-Factor and
Marshal-Olkin methods are consistent. However, some differences
exist between probabilities predicted by the S-Factor and the
RSS bounding technique.
In a recent study at MIT by Modarres et. al. (1), a
quantifying methodology has been proposed. In this technique the
common cause candidates that are obtained by using the new
-13-
criteria described in task 3 are used to quantify the safety
systems. This technique is based on the Markovian approach.
Similar to other quantifying methods, lack of data base is its
most important limitation. Its methodology is fairly complex.
In this task a review of these potential quantifying methods
will be made. A promising technique will be selected for incor-
poration into the CCF code. Possible changes in the methodology
might be required in order to properly implement the selected
methodology into the code.
Task 5: Application of this Study to the Problems of
Interest
This task will be performed with a close cooperation of
the sponsors. The task includes the following steps;
- selection of a particular safety system;
- development of its fault tree diagram;
- identification of desired generic failures;
* - generation of the cutsets along with their potential
common cause candidates by using the developed code;
- quantification of the system unavailability by using
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Notes:
*Allocated project level costs and program coordination at
10% of other salaries and wages.
**27.9% of non-student salaries and wages.
***72% of total salaries and wages plus employee benefits minus
55% of student research assistant salaries and wages through
6/30/82; after 6/30/82, 51.5% of Modified Total Direct Cost
(includes salaries and wages, employee benefits, materials
and services, travel, services, subgrants and subcontracts
up to $25K each, less 60% research assistant salaries and
wages, less equipment with unit cost of $500 and useful life
of 2+ years).
#The budget is shown broken into two parts merely for accounting
convenience; this is not a phased project.
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Computer Expenses
The comparison of the codes will be accomplished on the
IBM system at MIT if conversion from CDC can be accomplished
with little or no problem. If the conversion is difficult,
the code comparison will be done on the basis of criterion
not related to execution time; the codes designed for the CDC
system will be run on the CDC machine, and the IBM codes will
be run on the IBM machine. If the CDC codes are not easily
converted to the IBM machine and one of the CDC codes is
selected as most promising, further effort will be made to
make the conversion to IBM.
I~ ____~~__WLIIIUI___ ~i~--iC. .-IF X~ C~II~IIIUII I_ I~-
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i. Objectives of the Proposal
The main objective of the proposed research is to develop
methods for common cause analysis useful in utility large-scale
probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs). Previous emphasis at
M.I.T. in common cause analysis research has been primarily on




Advantages of this approach include provision of a systematic
framework for performing detailed analysis of system reliability.
However, fault tree analysis on the level of detail taken in such
specific system studies may not be required for every system
studied in a large-scale, complete PRA of the entire plant. As
has been shown in the Zion study , methodS, for reducing fault
tree size and level of detail have been developed and applied in
performing plant specific, large-scale PRAs. Thus, a simplified
approach to common cause analysis may be desirable in a large-scale
utility PRA for reasons of reduced cost and enhanced use of available
data.
2. Expected Benefits
The expected benefits for the utilities are to obtain methods,
which will be encoded into a computer package, for performing com-
mon cause analysis in a large scale plant specific PRA. This code
will constitute an alternative to the very detailed analysis repre-
sented in the MOBB package developed for extended systems re-
liability studies at M.I.T.1 ,2,3
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3. Proposed Methodological Approach
The method that we proposeto study and develop into a tool
for large-scale PRA common cause analysis is that of the combined
cause-table and discrete-probability-distribution (DPD) approach.
These methods have been primarily utilized in the Z/IP studies,
and have been described in the available literature.5 '6 To de-
scribe further our proposed approach it is necessary to begin with
a few definitions and then expand further into how the cause table
is applied, and how DPD arithmetic is used in external event analy-
sis. We shall do this now. (The following description comes from
reference 7.)
The cause table was developed in the Z/IP study to help struc-
ture the process of enumeration and analysis of failure causes for
combinations of component failures (ie., minimal cutsets). It for-
malizes the necessary steps in the systems analysis process between
the point of determining the cutsets to the point of having an al-
gebraic expression for the system unavailability (or other relia-
bility performance characteristic). The cause table idea provides
a "jumping off" point in our study of common cause failures.
An example cause table of a hypothetical system having seven
components given the letters A through G is presented in Table 1.
The system in the example has two single component cutsets, one
with two components and one with three components. In Part I,
information about the accident sequences in which the system is de-
manded and which establish the boundary conditions of the system
analysis is compiled. Failure causes acting on the components
singly are itemized in Part II, and the common causes of multiple
failure in Part III. Common cause failures are always enumerated
-3-
TASLE 3-i. EXAMPLE CAUSE TABLE FOR CAUSES AFFECTING SINGLE AND'MULTIPLE COMPC~E~TS
SYSTEM: Sample
C .:OE0NTS: A, B, C, D, E, F, G
MINIMAL CUTSETS: A, D, BC, EFG
Part I - Accident Sequence Dependent Boundary Conditions
Changes inInterfacing Systems ntenl and
Initiating Accident Failures and Boundary Internal and
e Failures and Boundary ExternalEvent Sequence Conditions Environmental
Environment
Part II - Single Failure Cause Sets
Components
Cause Category







Part III - Multiple Failure Cause Sets
Component Failure Sets
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in the cause table such that the single point failures show up as
single event cutsets -in the system model and associated logic
function.
The second half of the methodological approach is associated
external event analysis and DPD arithmetic. In a sense, external
events constitute both initiators of accidents and a possibility
for common cause failure. It is possible to extend the fragility
curve concept to other types of common causes; human error, corro-
sion, environmental stresses, etc.* We propose to .attempt to extend
the Beta-Factor concept by using the DPD-fragility curve-external
event analysis technique. It may be possible to define Beta Factor
Functions that represent the susceptibility of a particular component
type to the particular environmental cause of failure present. That
is, along any particular accident sequence (i.e.; path in the systems
event tree), a different environment may be implied due to various
system failures so higher humidity, more corrosive materials in air
due to particulate production and fission product releases, etc.).
These effects can produce higher Beta-Factors resulting in higher
system unavailabilities (i.e., higher system failure rates).** By
using Beta "functions" that systematically take into account the
effect on components of each environmental cause, a more systematic
procedure can be developed for estimating the effect on the overall
system failure rate (unavailability). The concept of the Beta Fac-
tor Function can perhaps, allow for a better characterization of
*This point is recognized in Section 3.7 of the NRC PRA Procedures
Guide written by K. Fleming of Pickard, Lowe, and Garrick, Inc. These
Mr. Fleming describes, categories of dependent failures noting that
to model physical interactions that result in multiple system/com-
ponent failures with event specific models is entirely legitimate.
**WASH-1400 handled this problem by increasing the system failure
rates along the event tree using expert judgement.
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system dependencies in the event trees, upon which the results of
a large-scale PRA depend (see Figure 1).
Suppose failure of system A produces a heavy steam environme
how does the failure rate of system B change as a result, i.e.:




What is the ratio of random to system dependent failure rates (given
functional operation of system B is independent of system A). The answer to this
question could be simply derived directly fromexpert opinion (ie.,
failure rate of B directly estimated by -experts) or the question
could be asked on a sub-system (or component/cutset) level. The
system cause table can be modified as the"'event tree is analyzed to
facilitate this process.
Suppose now that system C has a failure rate dependent on
steam and corrosion as possible causes that increase the failure
rate (Figure 2) . Suppose systems A and B fail and produce this envircn-
ment; now #{CIBf,AfI = 1 if these conditions exceed the design limit
of C for these environmental conditions.
For purposes of illustration, imagine that we have a specific
component or'system, S, at a specific location in the plant, L,
and wish to know the risk of failure of this component or system
due to changes in the environment (corrosion, temperature and/or
humidity changes, etc.). We first need a statement of how
-6-











FIGUR 2 Introduction of Third System Dependency
System A System B System C
S{cf lBf Af)
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likely it is that the environment will change. This could be
done by expressing the information in the form of a frequency of
exceedance curve (see Figure 3). The ordinate of this curve over
any value, x, gives the frequency with which environments of sever-
ity "x" or greater occur at the location L2*
The second item of information needed is a characterization
of the ability of the component or system to resist environments
of various severities. This characterization can be done in the
form of a cumulative distribution function that maps, F, the com-
ponent or system failure fraction against the severity of the en-
vironment, x (see Figure 4). The ordinate here, F(x), gives the
fraction of components orsystems failing under environmental sever-
ity "x".
Specifically, what this means is that~,we envision a thought
experiment in which thousands of systems (components), S, are
subjected to environmental stresses of magnitude "x" and type i.e.;
F(xi ) is then the fraction that fails in this experiment. (Data
of this nature are generally available from component manufacturers;
on the system level, some information of this nature is also avail-
able).
Now assume that we had run the experiment and know the curve
F(xi) exactly. Similarly, suppose we had monitored the location
in the plant for many years and knew the curves 0 (x i ) exactly.
Then, the frequency of system failure, f, due to environmental
stress i would be given by:
S= F(x) dx (1)
o dx
*Ue can also express the effect of system A failure on the frequency
of observing condition x as (xAf#c) at location L given historical
experience c. Lxf
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FIGURE 3 Environmental Stress Curve (CDF and PDF forms)*







Environmental Stress, x Environmental Stress, x
**Likelihood of Observing
Environmental Condition, x,
Give System A Fails.
















Environmental Stress (xi), i=l...n types of
environmental stress (Severity of Environment)
*Corresponds to Fragility Curves in Seismic Analysis; Data acquired
from manufacturers for environmental stress i.
**Fj(x i ) p ability of system j to resist various levels of enviromental
stress type i.
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The variable f may be regarded as the quantitative measure of
environmental stress related risk to S at L. Thus, by evaluating
the integral in (1), we could calculate the answer to our question.
Probabilistic Calculation
Following Kaplan [6] once again, let us acknowledge that we
really do not know the environmental stress curves O(x) exactly.
We can, however, use the DPD idea to express our uncertainty. in
4(x) by putting forth a finite family of curves, Ok (x), and
assigning to each a probability pk. Thus, we have a set of doublets:
0 - {<Pk' k(x)>} (2)
which we may plot graphically as in Figure 5.
Similarly, since we have not done a "real" experiment,
we do not know the environmental susceptibility curves perfectly.
We therefore express our state-of-knowledge about susceptibility by
writing a DPD:
F {<qe ,Fe(x) >} (3)
Pictorially, we have the family:












We next perform the operation of equation (1) on the DPDs (2) and
(3) obtaining thus the DPD:
F = {<Pk1 fkl > }





The DPD (4) can now be smoothed and plotted as a PDF:
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Outputs of DPD/Seismic Analogy (DPD-SA) Model
(1) Method for estimating $ factors for use as input into CCA code
package (MOBB )-
(2) Method for treating system non-functional dependencies in
the accident event trees so as to provide a systematic way to change the
system failure rate calculated from fault trees (based on cause table
inputs) to account for these dependencies. (Lethod for estimating
failure frequencies in cause table.)
How to Relate to Cause Table
(1) Use cause table to determine which causes to perform the
DPD-SA analysis on, and
(2) Cause table helps organize expert's thoughts and provides
a way to document such thinking.
4. Suggested Work Statement
We shall perform the following tasks:
TASK 1: Develop and refine, for practical use by utility analysts,
the cause table/DPD approach to common cause analysis described in
section 3 of this proposal.
TASK 2: Develop an analytic package based on the approach of
section 3 to estimate cause-specific Beta-Factors compatible with the
MOBB code developed in earlier work.
TASK 3: Demonstrate the use of the cause-table/DPD approach in
application to a system example provided by the utility sponsors.
TASK 4: Perform a comparison of the results of this approach with
the more detailed approach making use of the MOB'B code package with
and without the Beta-Factor estimation metlhods developed in Task 3.
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5. Key Dates and Reports
The effort will involve a one year project that will accomplish
the following:
(1) Completion of Tasks 1 and 2 - producing an analytic package
(computer program routine) to estimate cause-specific Beta Factors
that is compatible with MOBB . (first 5-6 months).
(2) Completion of Task 3 - demonstrates the use of the cause
table/DPD approach on a sample utility system. (2-3 months).
(3) Completion of Task 4 - comparison of the results of this
approach with standard MOBB code approach (2-3 months).
The product of the project will be a final report and an analytic
package for estimating Beta factors based on the cause table/DPD
approach. A user's guide on the package will also be provided. These
will be provided within 3 months after the project completion. A


























*Allocated project level costs and program coordination at' 10% of
other S&W.
**30% of non-student S&W.
***51.5% of Modified Total Direct Cost (includes S&W, employee benefits,
M&S, travel, services, subgrants up to $25k each, less 60% research
assistant S&W, less equipment with unit cost of $500 and useful life
of 2+ years.
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